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ABSTRACT
The business model under which the pharmaceutical industry has operated in the
recent past has become untenable. The era that has seen a consistent pipeline of
blockbuster medicines for common chronic diseases is waning. New paradigms for
more efficient and more economical drug development are being sought and
implemented. Recent growth both in the repurposing of existing drugs and in the
orphan product market has signaled the new hope for success and profit. New
technology and the promise of personalized medicine augment the sense of
optimism in this time of complementary transition in the wider healthcare industry.
Yet, are the new paradigms sustainable within the framework of the Orphan Drug
Act as implemented today? What is the cost of rare disease and orphan product
development to the relevant stakeholders: government, private payers, patients
and families, caregivers, research universities, biotechnology firms, and
pharmaceutical companies? This article considers the perpetual debate: what is
the appropriate balance between access and innovation, specifically in the context of
incentivizing therapies for rare disease?
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ADOPTING PHARMACOGENOMICS AND PARENTING REPURPOSED
MOLECULES UNDER THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: A COST DILEMMA?
DAVID C. BABAIAN*

I. HEALTHCARE AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG OVERVIEW
A macroeconomic view of healthcare costs in the United States
reveals an unsustainable trajectory. Despite the recent slowdown in
the growth of healthcare spending, it is well documented that the cost
curve of healthcare has trended upward in the U.S., which spends
approximately 17.9% of gross domestic product (“GDP”) on healthcare
annually.1 U.S. healthcare spending topped $2.8 trillion in 2012—
$8,915 per person—with a growth rate of 3.7%.2 The per capita
expenditure exceeds that of Norway, the second highest, by more than
$2,500.3 Furthermore, there is no evidence that the added investment
improves health outcomes.4
The cost of prescription drugs mimics this general trend, although
still only 11% of total healthcare spending in the U.S.5 Of note, the
U.S., unlike many other countries, has a private pharmaceutical
market with no caps on the pricing structure.6 Retail prescription drug

* © David C. Babaian 2014. David C. Babaian received his J.D. from The John Marshall Law
School in 2005. After serving as a judicial clerk in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
and, thereafter, adjudicating disability claims with the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, he
recently completed the LL.M. program in health law at the University of Washington, while working
at Quorum Review IRB. Though there are numerous mentors and colleagues owed a debt of
gratitude, the author would especially like to thank Mary and Richard Babaian and Dawn Stanek
for their constant support and insight.
1 Mark B. McClellan, Bending the Cost Curve in Health Care the Right Way—Through Better,
More Person-Centered Care, BROOKINGS (May 9, 2013, 1:54 P.M.), http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/09-bending-health-care-cost-curve-mcclellan.
2 National Health Expenditures 2012 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 1,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2014)
[hereinafter CMS 2012 Highlights].
3 Anne K. Lindahl, The Norwegian Health Care System, 2012, in INTERNATIONAL PROFILES OF
HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, 2012 87 (Sarah Thomson et al. eds., 2012), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2012/Nov/1645_Squi
res_intl_profiles_hlt_care_systems_2012.pdf; Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States
& Selected OECD Countries, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://kff.org/healthcosts/issue-brief/snapshots-health-care-spending-in-the-united-states-selected-oecd-countries/
[hereinafter Snapshots, KAISER].
4 Snapshots, Kaiser, supra note 3.
5 The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 19,
2013), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/the-medicare-prescription-drug-benefit-fact-sheet/.
6 See generally, Neeraj Sood et al., The Effect of Regulation on Pharmaceutical Revenues:
Experience in Nineteen Countries, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w125, w125, w126 (2009) (citing an
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spending increased 0.4% to $263.3 billion in 2012, following a 2.5%
increase in 2011.7 The acceleration was partly due to both faster
growth in prescription drug prices, particularly for brand-name and
specialty drugs, and increased spending on new brands.8 Still, the
growth in spending on retail prescription drugs has slowed
significantly over the past decade, falling from 11.6% in 2000 to 1.2%
in 2010.9 This deceleration is attributable, in part, to the increasing
prevalence of generic drugs; generics comprised 80% of total
prescriptions in 2011, up from 63% in 2006.10 Continued loss of patent
protection for prominent drugs—expected to remain significant
through 2015—will also continue to lower the growth of spending.11
While growth has slowed, overall expenditures continue to rise.
Moreover, in 2010, 90% of seniors and 57% of non-elderly adults had a
prescription drug expense.12 Additionally, the number of prescribed
medicines has increased; from 1999 to 2011, prescriptions rose 43%
(from 2.8 billion to 4 billion), outpacing U.S. population growth by
34%.13 Of note, it was reported in 2012 that the eleven most expensive
medicines in the U.S. were for the treatment of rare diseases.14 With
increasing penetrance of prescriptions into all segments of the
population, the cost implications for patients, private health insurers,
and government payers require attention.
No less significantly, the biomedical industry is an important
sector of the U.S. economy, directly employing 1.2 million people with a

International Trade Administration study, which reported an 18 to 67% increase in the price of bestselling patented drugs in the U.S.).
7 CMS 2012 Highlights, supra note 2, at 2.
8 Id.
9 Kenneth Kaufman, Bending the Health Care Cost Curve: More than Meets the Eye? HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Apr. 13, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/04/13/bending-the-health-care-cost-curvemore-than-meets-the-eye/.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY tbl. 2 (2010), http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/
tables_compendia_hh_interactive.jsp?_SERVICE=MEPSSocket0&_PROGRAM=MEPSPGM.TC.SAS
&File=HCFY2010&Table=HCFY2010%5FPLEXP%5FA&VAR1=AGE&VAR2=SEX&VAR3=RACET
H5C&VAR4=INSURCOV&VAR5=POVCAT10&VAR6=MSA&VAR7=REGION&VAR8=HEALTH&V
ARO1=4+17+44+64&VARO2=1&VARO3=1&VARO4=1&VARO5=1&VARO6=1&VARO7=1&VARO8
=1&_Debug= (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
13 Prescription Drugs: The High Costs of High Costs, PAYERFUSION.COM CEO’S BLOG (May 14,
2013), https://payerfusion.com/ceos-blog/prescription-drugs-high-costs/.
14 The 11 Most Expensive Medicines in America, MEDICAL BILLING & CODING BLOG (Feb. 6,
2012),
http://www.medicalbillingandcoding.org/blog/the-11-most-expensive-medicines-in-america/
(listing Soliris at $409,500/year; Elaprase at $375,000/year; Naglazyme at $365,000/year; Cinryze at
$350,000/year; Folotyn at $30,000/month; ACTH at $300,000/year; Myozyme at $300,000/year;
Arcalyst at $250,000/year; Ceredase/Cerezyme at $150,000/year; Fabrazyme at $200,000/year; and
Aldurazyme at $200,000/year).
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total output of $519 billion in 2009.15 “U.S.-based companies produced
nearly 60% of the world’s new medicines, up from 42% the previous
decade.”16 The regulatory apparatus that supports drug development
and manufacturing is likewise instrumental in that success. The task
of balancing life-science innovation and leadership with meaningful
and efficient oversight is as paramount as ever. Yet, new technologies
and the recent promise of personalized medicine may necessitate
departures from standard models of healthcare regulation. The
increasingly patient-centered paradigm, epitomized by the renaissance
of the Orphan Drug Act, is potentially an apt laboratory for evaluating
efficient, sustainable drug delivery and healthcare systems more
broadly.
II. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) PRIMER
From snake oil liniment for the masses to Kalydeco for the few, the
FDA’s enforcement role in consumer protection has changed
considerably over its lifetime. While initially concerned primarily with
safety, Congress amended the original Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”) to include efficacy review in 1962.17
The FDA’s
responsibilities have continued to expand, and “today the agency
monitors products that account for twenty-five cents of every dollar in
U.S. consumer spending”—including tobacco, food, cosmetics, and
drugs.18
The FDA is charged with ensuring the safety and efficacy of
medical products. Generally, no drug,19 biologic,20 or device21 can be
15 Andrew von Eschenbach, Medical Innovation: How the U.S. Can Retain Its Lead, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 14, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577215403399350874
.html; see also ROSS C. DEVOL ET AL., THE GLOBAL BIOMEDICAL INDUSTRY: PRESERVING U.S.
LEADERSHIP 1, 16 (Milken Inst. 2011), available at http://www.ncnano.org/CAMIExecSum.pdf.
16 von Eschenbach, supra note 15. The relative contribution of the U.S. to the total scientific
output for 88 rare metabolic disorders fell more than 4% from 1996–1998 to 2009–2011, from 28.2%
to 23.6% respectively; the second largest contributor, U.K., contributed a 6.6% share. Remco e
Vrueh, China has Joined the Fight Against Rare Disorders (June 30, 2012),
http://www.rarediseasematters.org/2012/06/china-has-joined-the-fight-against-rare-disorders/.
17 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780.
The Kefauver Harris
Amendment passed in the wake of the thalidomide tragedy that occurred in Europe; children were
born with birth defects due to their mothers’ use of the drug during pregnancy. Kefauver-Harris
Amendments
Revolutionized
Drug
Development,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm322856.htm (last updated Apr. 12, 2013).
18 von Eschenbach, supra note 15.
19 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (2012).

The term “drug” means (A) articles recognized in the official United States
Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or
official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals; and(C) articles (other than food) intended to
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marketed in the U.S. without FDA approval. Investigational products
or test articles typically require submission of an Investigational New
Drug application (“IND”) or an Investigational Device Exemption
(“IDE”) with the FDA.22 Subsequent clinical trials are generally
divided into three phases.23 Phase I investigates the safety of the
chemical at different dosages in a small cohort of typically healthy
volunteers.24 Phase II expands the study of the test article into a
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and(D)
articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B),
or (C).
Id.

20 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012). Under the Public Health Safety Act (PHS), a biological product
is defined as any “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous
product . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human
beings.” Id. Biologics are treated as drugs for the purpose of Investigational New Drug Applications
(IND) requirements. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS,
SPONSORS, AND IRBS:
INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS (INDS)—DETERMINING
WHETHER HUMAN RESEARCH STUDIES CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT AN IND 3 (2013),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM229175.pdf
[hereinafter
GUIDANCE FOR
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS].
21 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012).

The term “device” . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine,
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including
any component, part, or accessory, which is—
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purposes.
Id.

22 Investigational New Drug (IND) or Device Exemption (IDE) Process (CBER), U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/developmentapprovalprocess/
investigationalnewdrugindordeviceexemptionideprocess/default.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2011); see
also GUIDANCE FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, supra note 20.
23 The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last updated May 1,
2012). So-called Phase 0 trials constitute exploratory IND studies. See Am. Cancer Soc’y, Phase 0
Clinical Trials: Exploring if and How a New Drug May Work, http://www.cancer.org/treatment/
treatmentsandsideeffects/clinicaltrials/whatyouneedtoknowaboutclinicaltrials/clinical-trials-whatyou-need-to-know-phase0 (last updated Sept. 21, 2012); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, & REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY IND STUDIES 3 (2006)
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm078933.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
24 What
are the Phases of Clinical Trials?, MD ANDERSON CANCER CTR.,
http://www.mdanderson.org/patient-and-cancer-information/cancer-information/clinical-
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moderately sized patient population, to evaluate safety and potential
biological effect.25 Phase III further expands the number of research
participants to investigate the clinical value of the test article.26 Once
Phase III trials have been completed, typically a New Drug Application
(“NDA”), Biologic License Application (“BLA”), or a Premarket
Approval (“PMA”) application must be submitted by the applicant and
filed by the FDA prior to marketing.27
Unanticipated complications associated with prominent drugs like
Vioxx have pressured the agency to require larger clinical trials and
more data from companies to identify even infrequent adverse
events.28 It has been reported that “clinical trials from 2003–2006
were nearly 70% longer than those from 1999–2002.”29
This
environment has seen increasingly complex clinical trials result in
increased drug-development costs.30 Estimates vary considerably, but
in 1999, a conservative estimate showed costs on average exceeding
$300 million and more than ten years to bring a drug to market.31
DiMasi et al. calculated industry expenditure per new drug approved
at $802 million.32 Including the cost of unsuccessful drug candidates,
it has recently been reported that a pharmaceutical company will
spend an estimated $5 billion per new drug successfully brought to

trials/phases-of-clinical-trials/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Phases of Clinical
Trials].
25 FDA’s Drug Review Process, supra note 23; see also FAQ; What are Clinical Trial Phases?,
U.S. NAT’L LIB. MED., https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?cid=14293ACF9D02CB06&resid=14293
ACF9D02CB06!384&app=WordPdf&wdo=1 (last updated Apr. 18, 2008).
26 See
Phases of Clinical Trials, supra note 24.
Post-marketing surveillance or
pharmacovigilance is often referred to as Phase IV. Viraj Suvarna, Phase IV of Drug Development, 1
PERSPS. IN CLINICAL RES. 57, 57 (2010).
27 Janice M. Reichert, Trends in Development and Approval Times for New Therapeutics in the
United States, 2 NATURE REVS. 695, 699 (2003). A former Commissioner of the FDA has
recommended that phase III trials essentially be pushed to post-marketing surveillance in order to
reduce the cost of bringing a product to market. von Eschenbach, supra note 15. This
recommendation would essentially return the pre-marketing regulatory process to its original focus
surrounding product safety, as opposed to efficacy. Problematically, however, companies likely
would still be required to demonstrate effectiveness prior to reaping profits, as insurers increasingly
require health technology assessments for inclusion in formularies and providers continue to
demand cost-effectiveness research to inform treatment decisions. Also, substantial costs would
then be diverted to more robust post-marketing surveillance.
28 von Eschenbach, supra note 15. Despite earlier data indicative of cardiac complications, it
was not until 2004 that Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market, after the results of a study to
investigate the drug for another purpose—the treatment of colon polyps. Snigdha Prakash & Vikki
Valentine, Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Vioxx, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 10, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5470430.
29 von Eschenbach, supra note 15.
30 Id.
31 Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right with It, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 304 (1999).
32 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs,
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (in 2000 dollars).
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market.33 These costs, necessarily passed on to patients and payors,
impact the overall expense of healthcare in the U.S. Additionally, for
better or worse, notably absent from the FDA’s regulatory mandate is
any consideration of therapy cost or cost-effectiveness. Moreover,
subsequent formulary decisions and treatment recommendations made
by payors and providers, respectively, are completely removed from the
FDA approval process.34
The impact of a protracted and complex regulatory process also
potentially threatens innovation and the economy more pervasively. A
2012 survey found approximately 80% of life sciences CEOs did not
believe that “the FDA regulatory approval process ‘is the best in the
world,’ and 81% believed that ‘within five years, another country could
conceivably recreate the ecosystem that has made the U.S. the leading
biomedical region in the world.’”35 Obviously, such a drastic scenario
could threaten the loss of jobs and domestic capacity for research and
development.36
III. THE FDA AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
There are many available means to protect intellectual property in
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Most prominently,
patents generally provide owners the right to exclude others from
various activities, including sale of the protected product, for a term of
20 years.37 Since a patent is filed prior to initiation of the FDA
regulatory process, much of the fixed patent term will be lost because
the patent owner cannot exploit its monopoly power without FDA
approval to market the product.
Appreciating the increasingly
protracted approval process, Congress passed the Drug Price
33 Matthew Herper, The Cost Of Creating A New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma To
Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-thestaggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/; see also Matthew Herper,
The Truly Staggering Cost Of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-newdrugs/.
34 This has the potential to create circumstances in which FDA-approved drugs are nonetheless
unavailable to patients due to subsequent health technology assessments. For example, physicians
at Sloan Kettering Memorial Hospital have refused to prescribe the drug, Zaltrap, which is more
expensive and has not been shown to be more cost effective than alternatives. Peter B. Bach et al.,
In
Cancer
Care,
Cost
Matters,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
14,
2012,
at
A25,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/opinion/a-hospital-says-no-to-an-11000-a-month-cancerdrug.html.
35 von Eschenbach, supra note 15 (quoting CAL. HEALTHCARE INST., 2012 CALIFORNIA
BIOMEDICAL INDUSTRY REPORT 26 (2012)).
36 Id.
37 See generally, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., General Information Concerning Patents,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp (last visited Apr. 13,
2014).
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Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly
known as Hatch-Waxman).38 The statute enables the owners of
patents on certain human drugs, biologics, and medical devices to
restore to the terms of those patents some of the time lost while
awaiting . . . government approval.39
The rights derived from
extension of the patent term are limited to the product approved.
Subject to various deductions and limitations, the patent term is
generally extended by the time equal to the duration of the testing and
regulatory period after the patent issued, but, when added to the
remaining life of the patent, not to exceed fourteen years.40 Of note,
the pharmaceutical industry has not brought to market new
blockbuster therapies as quickly as its patents are expiring.41
Distinct from market monopoly based on patent, Congress has
enabled the FDA to grant exclusivity periods to incentivize various
types of drug testing. Under such a regimen, the FDA generally will
not grant market approval to follow-on products for a specified term,
eliminating competition and creating monopoly pricing power during
that time.42 For example, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a 180-day
exclusivity period for the first generic manufacturer to file an
abbreviated NDA (“ANDA”) challenging an innovator’s drug patent.43
There are distinct differences between these two forms of
protection. Patents provide broader protection, since the scope is not
necessarily limited to a specific use.44 While both spur investment and
38 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman), Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
39 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2750 (9th ed. Mar. 2014). On December 3, 1993, 35 U.S.C. § 156
was further amended to provide for interim extension of a patent’s term where a product embodied
in the claim(s) was expected to receive FDA approval, but not until after the original expiration
date. Id.
40 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012). The USPTO calculates the extension term based on the testing
and approval phases of the FDA’s regulatory review process. Id. The testing phase is calculated
from the time the IND application is filed, and the approval phase is calculated from the time the
NDA is submitted to the FDA. Id. The formula allows the patent holder to recuperate half of the
testing phase and the entire approval phase toward a maximum of a five-year patent extension but
no more than fourteen years from the date of NDA approval. Id.
41 C.H.,
Health spending Cost Curve, Slightly Bent, ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/01/health-spending; see also George J.
Brewer, Drug Development for Orphan Diseases in the Context of Personalized Medicine, 154
TRANSLATIONAL RES. 314, 320 (2009).
42 Wendy H. Schacht & John R. Thomas, Follow-On Biologics:
The Law and Intellectual
Property Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV. (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41483.pdf
43 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1) (2009); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION AND RES. (CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, 180-DAY GENERIC DRUG EXCLUSIVITY
UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 1
(June 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf.
44 See Enrique Seoane-Vazquez et al., Incentives for Orphan Drug Research and Development
in the United States, 3 ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES 33 (2008).
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venture capital, market exclusivity has a few advantages over
patents.45 First, the former does not necessarily reward innovation
like a patent. There are typically no requirements that the product for
which exclusivity is granted be novel or non-obvious—though no doubt
having utility based on demonstrated effectiveness when used as
indicated in the associated labeling.46 Unlike the five years of data
exclusivity provided for by the Hatch-Waxman Act, the exclusivity
afforded by the Orphan Drug Act is independent of product
classification as a new chemical entity.47 Second, the duration of
marketing exclusivity does not run during development and FDA
review, as the life of a patent begins to run from the filing date.48
Third, market exclusivity is less susceptible to litigation, and the FDA,
in essence, is responsible for policing the market by limiting approvals.
As a result, both the market exclusivity and the patent can be
leveraged to create monopoly power in the market, and orphan
products are no exception.
IV. RARE DISEASE AND THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT (“ODA”)49
The public health implications of rare disease are significant. The
National Institutes of Health has identified nearly 7,000 such rare
diseases, and it is estimated that 250 new rare diseases are described
annually.50 Together these conditions affect approximately 25–30

45 Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 84
(2009). Of note, it will be interesting to see if market exclusivity has more importance in light of potential
repercussions arising from the recent Myriad decision. See generally, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, et al. v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al., 569 U.S. __ (2013).
46 Marlene E. Haffner et al., Two Decades of Orphan Product Development, 1 NATURE REVS.
821, 821 (2002).
47 Kate Greenwood, Turning “Recycled Molecules” into Orphan Drugs: Time to Experiment
with Calibrated Incentives? 3 (final conference draft) (available upon request).
48 Id.; Cotropia, supra note 45, at 81.
49 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 1(b)(4), 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified principally at
21 U.S.C. § 360aa–360ee). Apparently, “Quincy, M.E.” publicized the problem relating to the
paucity of treatments for rare diseases and garnered much support for the plight just prior to the
passage of the ODA. Alexander Gaffney, 30 Years Later, FDA Looks Back on Passage of the Orphan
Drug Act, REGULATORY FOCUS (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-articleview/article/2686/30-years-later-fda-looks-back-on-passage-of-orphan-drug-act.aspx.
The issue
continues to find traction in popular culture, notably with the film “Extraordinary Measures” (2010)
and, very recently, in the television show “The Blacklist.” An episode of the latter portrayed a
bioterrorist bent on infecting larger segments of the population with a rare disease afflicting his son,
in order to create incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to develop a cure. See Jason Evans, ‘The
Blacklist’ Recap, Season 1, Episode 7, ‘Frederick Barnes’, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2013,
http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2013/11/04/the-blacklist-recap-season-1-episode-7-frederick-barnes/.
50 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF RARE
DISEASES
RESEARCH,
http://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/about-ordr/pages/31/frequently-askedquestions (last visited Apr. 13, 2014); Olivier Wellman-Labadie & Youwen Zhou, The US Orphan
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million people in the U.S. and an estimated 350 million worldwide.51
Approximately 80% of all rare diseases are genetic.52 Fifty percent of
those affected in the U.S. are children, and 35% of deaths in the first
year of life are attributable to rare disease.53 Less than five percent of
rare diseases currently have a treatment; 95% of rare diseases lack a
single FDA-approved therapy.54 Therefore, orphan drugs are an
important issue for approximately one in ten people in the U.S.—not
including family members, caregivers, and advocacy groups.
The expense of drug development coupled with limited return on
investment created little incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to
develop products that affected only small populations. This economic
reality results in “drug loss,” or the opportunity cost measured in
additional therapies that might otherwise have been brought to
market but for prolonged regulatory processes and pursuit of candidate
drugs with only highly profitable margins.55 As a result, Abbey Myers
helped form a coalition which successfully advocated for legislation and
which later became the National Organization for Rare Diseases
(“NORD”).56 Congress acted to incentivize research surrounding these
so-called orphaned conditions, to encourage companies to parent such
test articles through the regulatory process. The moniker “orphan,”
expresses the neglect that derives from the unwillingness of sponsors
to develop and bring to market treatments for rare disease due to lack
of profitability.57 The Orphan Drug Act passed in 1982, and was
signed into law by President Reagan in January 1983.58
Pursuant to the Act, drugs and biologics may be conferred orphan
status if intended for the safe and effective treatment, diagnosis, or
prevention of rare diseases/disorders that affect (1) fewer than 200,000
people in the United States or (2) more than 200,000 people, but for
which there is nonetheless “no reasonable expectation that the cost of
developing and making available in the United States a drug for such
disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of
Drug Act: Rare Disease Research Stimulator or Commercial Opportunity?, 95 HEALTH POLICY 216,
217 (2010).
51 Kiran N. Meekings et al., Orphan Drug Development: an economically viable strategy for
biopharma R&D, 17 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 660 (2012).
52 PhRMA, RARE DISEASES: A REPORT ON ORPHAN DRUGS IN THE PIPELINE, MEDS. IN DEV.
2013 REPORT 7 (2013), available at http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Rare_Diseases_2013.pdf.
53 Id. at 4.
54 Id. at 7.
55 Michael Tennent, The FDA, Neither Safe nor Effective, NEW AM. (Sept. 16, 2010, 1:00 A.M.),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/health-care/item/1805-the-fda-neither-safe-nor-effective;
see also Glossary, FDA REVIEW.ORG, http://www.fdareview.org/glossary.shtml#drug_lag (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014).
56 See generally Vision and Mission, NORD, https://www.rarediseases.org/about/vision-mission
(last visited December 13, 2013).
57 21 C.F.R § 316.3(b)(10) (2013). The term is specifically defined in the regulations to mean “a
drug intended for use in a rare disease or condition as defined in section 526 of the act.” Id.
58 Haffner et al., supra note 46, at 821.
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such drug.”59 Various amendments to the legislation have been passed
since enactment. The original version of the ODA defined a rare
disease or condition using only the second prong of the current
definition.60 However, drug sponsors were reluctant to invest the time
and money required to demonstrate commercial infeasibility and were
loath to disclose cost and expected revenue data to the FDA.61 As a
result of this uncertainty, the first prong was added by 1984
amendment.62 This rarity determination is typically based on the
prevalence of the disease.63 The sponsor bears the burden of providing
a rationale to meet the requisite rarity.64 Importantly, in addition to a
disease with prevalence less than 200,000, a sponsor may also seek
orphan designation for a drug that targets a particular subset of a
disease that otherwise would not satisfy the statutory limit.65 Also,
since only drugs that were not protected or eligible for a patent could
be granted exclusivity under the ODAas originally enacted—as patents
were viewed as a sufficient catalyst—Congress again amended the Act
in 1985 to extend its application to drugs that are patent-protected.66
Orphan drug designation can only be granted if received prior to the
application for marketing approval.67
Congress has devised many incentives for developing orphan
products.
Legislation provides marketing exclusivity, NDA fee
waivers,68 tax credits for related research, grant funding for study of
treatments for rare diseases, and eligibility for various types of

59 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.21(a)(1), (c) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(8)(ii) (1993); 21 U.S.C.
§ 360bb(b)(2) (2012).
60 Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 306.
61 Id. at 307.
62 Id.
Similarly, the humanitarian use device (“HUD”) program applies to a device that is
intended to treat or diagnose a disease or condition that affects fewer than 4,000 individuals in the
U.S. per year. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.3(n) (2013). A successful applicant would then receive a
humanitarian device exemption (HDE). Id. § 814.3(m).
63 21 C.F.R. § 316.21(b) (2012). Prevalence is defined in the Act as the number of persons in
the U.S. who have been diagnosed as having the condition at the time of submission of the request
for orphan designation. Id. Incidence may be used to calculate the number of individuals affected
by acute conditions.
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/HowtoapplyforOrph
anProductDesignation/ucm240819.htm (last updated January 22, 2013).
64 Haffner, supra note 46, at 824. See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 316.20, 316.21 (detailing submission
requirements for orphan-drug designation).
65 Haffner, supra note 46, at 824.
Interestingly, the 200,000 threshold was selected in
relationship to the estimated prevalence of narcolepsy and multiple sclerosis. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 4
(2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00380.pdf [hereinafter OIG, ODA].
66 Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985).
67 Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,118, 35,133 (June 12, 2013) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 316) [hereinafter Orphan Drug Regulations].
68 OIG, ODA, supra note 65, at 8. NDA fee waivers are a component of the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act (PDUFA). In 2001, this amounted to approximately $500,000. Id. at 4.
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expedited review.69 Also, open trials allow for wider access while
studies are ongoing.70 By 2008, over half of drugs in the fast track
program71 had orphan designations, and approximately one quarter of
the fifty fastest drug approvals have been for orphan products.72 Yet,
Seoane-Vazquez et al. found that the difference in FDA-review time
between orphan and non-orphan NMEs was not statistically
significant when divided into priority and standard review.73 Thus,
while more amenable to expedited review, it is not clear that orphan
products are reviewed any more quickly than non-orphan products
under expedited review.
Marketing exclusivity is widely regarded as the most powerful
incentive.74 Exclusivity assures that the FDA will not approve the
same drug for the same indication over a seven year period after
marketing approval of the original product.75 A manufacturer of an
orphan drug is only protected from competition from other
manufacturers seeking to sell the same drug for the treatment of the
same orphan disease.76 The ODA’s grant of exclusivity has three
exceptions.77 First, a subsequent applicant’s request for orphan
designation can be granted if that sponsor demonstrates a plausible
hypothesis that the drug, while otherwise the same chemical as a
previously designated orphan drug, is yet clinically superior.78 Second,
Haffner, supra note 46, at 821.
Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 312; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360dd (1983).
71 See Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review, U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forpatientadvocates/speedingaccesstoimportantnewthe
rapies/ucm128291.htm (last updated June 26, 2013). Section 112, “Expediting study and approval of
fast track drugs,” of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (“FDAMA”)
mandates the Agency to facilitate the development and expedite review of drugs and biologics
intended to treat serious or life-threatening conditions and that demonstrate the potential to
address unmet medical needs. Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR
SERIOUS
CONDITIONS—DRUGS
AND
BIOLOGICS
9
(Jun.
2013),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM3
58301.pdf.
72 Kurt Samson, Orphan Economics:
The Downside of Supply-side Pharmacology, ANNALS
NEUROLOGY, Sept. 2008, at A16.
73 Seoane-Vazquez et al., supra note 44 (“Statistically significant . . . differences in favor of
orphan NMEs were found for the use of any Fast Track or Subparts E/H review procedures (29.5%
vs. 9.5%), and also for NMEs given priority review by the FDA (83.5% vs. 35.4%).”).
74 Haffner, supra note 46, at 821; see also OIG, ODA, supra note 65 at 8–9.
75 OIG, ODA, supra note 65, at 8–9; see also Sigma-Tau Pharms. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 145
(4th Cir. 2002) (“By using the words ‘such drug for such disease or condition,’ Congress made clear
its intention that § 360cc(a) was to be disease-specific, not drug-specific. In other words, the statute
as written protects uses, not drugs for any and all uses.”).
76 21 C.F.R. § 316.34 (2013).
77 Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 311.
78 21 C.F.R. § 316.20(a) (2013). There are different definitions for determining the sameness of
molecules, depending on their size. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(14) (2013).
69
70
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the FDA can approve additional applications for the same drug
“if . . . the holder of the approved application . . . or of the license
cannot assure the availability of sufficient quantities of the drug to
meet the needs of persons with the disease or condition for which the
drug was designated.”79 Third, the statute allows the FDA to approve
additional applications based on consent of the original designee.80
It is worth pausing to note that even after the exclusivity period
expires, there is less incentive for other competitors to join the market,
due to the limited market size.81 In contrast, once a pharmaceutical
company identifies a profitable segment of the wider market,
competitors are apt to enter that market in an attempt to capture a
significant market share—a larger market can obviously accommodate
more competitors because the return is still divisible into substantial
portions. Marlene Haffner, a former director of the FDA’s Office of
Orphan Products Development (“OOPD”), has observed: “[w]ith the
chronicity of rare diseases and a drug that, for the most part, won’t
have competition—it’s yours and it’s yours beyond the seven-year
exclusivity[.] Money can be made.”82
The Biotechnology Industry Organization (“BIO”) released a 2012
statement emphasizing the importance of the other incentive measures
as well.83 Sponsors receive a tax credit for 50% of the cost of
Clinically superior means that a drug is shown to provide a significant
therapeutic advantage over and above that provided by an approved drug (that is
otherwise the same drug) in one or more of the following ways:
(i) Greater effectiveness than an approved drug (as assessed by effect on a
clinically meaningful endpoint in adequate and well controlled clinical trials).
Generally, this would represent the same kind of evidence needed to support a
comparative effectiveness claim for two different drugs; in most cases, direct
comparative clinical trials would be necessary; or
(ii) Greater safety in a substantial portion of the target populations, for example,
by the elimination of an ingredient or contaminant that is associated with
relatively frequent adverse effects. In some cases, direct comparative clinical
trials will be necessary; or
(iii) In unusual cases, where neither greater safety nor greater effectiveness has
been shown, a demonstration that the drug otherwise makes a major contribution
to patient care.
21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3) (2013).
79 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(1) (2013); see also 21 C.F.R. § 316.36(a) (2014).
80 21 C.F.R. § 316.36(b) (2014).
81 OIG, ODA, supra note 65, at 9 (“The market for most orphan products is not highly
competitive . . . .”); see also Seoane-Vazquez et al., supra note 44 (“Orphan NMEs had significantly
less . . . generic competition than other NMEs.”).
82 Samson, supra note 72, at A16.
83 Orphan Drugs:
BIO Submits Comments on Orphan Drug Regulations, BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUS. ORG. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.bio.org/advocacy/letters/orphan-drugs-bio-submitscomments-orphan-drug-regulations [hereinafter Orphan Drugs, BIO].
According to the
organization’s website,
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conducting clinical trials of orphan drugs.84 The Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) has estimated that the value of the tax credit
could rise from approximately $470 million in 2010 to over $1 billion in
2016.85
The ODA is administered through the OOPD, which sponsors have
regarded as a valuable resource.86 The OOPD provides study-design
assistance.87
Office funding is appropriated and distributed
specifically for the clinical research of drugs, biological products, foods,
and devices that are used to treat rare diseases. The OOPD attempts
to respond to requests for orphan designation within sixty days, but
the office has no role in the drug approval process.88 In the first year of
orphan grant funding, Congress appropriated $500,000, from which
eight studies were funded.89 As of 2002, twenty-one grants were
awarded to investigators at academic institutions, while startup firms
received the remaining grants; the OOPD program was the largest
single source of extramural clinical grants at the FDA.90 By 2010, the
funding amount increased to $14.1 million.91 Recently, the FDA has
apportioned the funding between ten to fifteen grantees.92 Through
2012, forty-five products supported by the OOPD grants program have

This includes recognizing that while market exclusivity of approved orphan products is a
major incentive to the development of drugs for rare diseases, the other statutory
incentives that arise from designation—such as tax credits, research grants, and
exemptions from the usual drug application user fees—are equally important in securing
and sustaining the necessary capital investments to develop orphan drugs.
Id. Ten others also submitted comments to a proposed FDA rule, including PhRMA, Pfizer,
GlaxoSmithKline, and Novartis.
See Orphan Drug Regulations, REGULATIONS.GOV,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=FDA-2011-N-0583 (last visited
December 12, 2013).
84 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 4.
The tax credit is useful to start-up companies without
taxable income, due to a twenty-year “carry forward” and a one-year “fall-back” provision. Id.
Providing flexibility, a sponsor may apply the credit to the taxes owed in a year during which related
costs are incurred. Id.
85 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 4.
86 OIG, ODA supra note 65, at 2.
The NIH also has an Office of Rare Disease Research
(ORDR). See About ORDR, OFF. OF RARE DISEASES RES., http://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/; see also
Harald E. Heemstra et al., Characteristics of Orphan Drug Applications that Fail to Achieve
Marketing Approval in the USA, 16 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 73 (2011).
87 Seoane-Vazquez et al., supra note 44.
88 OIG, ODA, supra note 65, at 5. In 2000, the average time to designate an orphan product
was 160 days. Id. at 11.
89 Haffner, supra note 46, at 822.
90 Id.
91 FAQ Concerning the Orphan Products Grants Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/WhomtoContactabo
utOrphanProductDevelopment/ucm224956.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 2010).
92 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 4.
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been approved for marketing.93 While of uncertain impact for orphan
drug approval specifically, the FDA expected to lose $209 million in the
2013 fiscal year—$126 million in budget authority and $83 million in
user fees—due to sequestration.94
These measures arguably have proven successful in creating
investment in the orphan space.95 In the ten years that preceded
enactment of the ODA, only ten products were approved for the
treatment of rare disease.96 By 2002, more than 1,000 drug and
biologic products had received orphan drug designation; the FDA had
approved 231 products (fifty biologics) for marketing.97 By 2013, thirty
years after the ODA’s passage, the FDA has designated 2,979 products
as “orphan drugs” and approved 456 for marketing.98 Ronald Reagan
hailed the legislation as “one of the most significant and successful
pieces of healthcare legislation during [his] presidency.”99
It is apparent that an increasing number of companies are availing
themselves of the ODA with success. Wellman-Labadie and Zhou
found that 73% of orphan-designated products are sponsored by an
array of biotechnology firms, indicating the importance of the ODA in
stimulating smaller businesses in the life sciences.100 In 2011, it was
estimated that the orphan drug market was worth more than $50
billion, and the market “turns out blockbusters at the same rate as the

93 Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/default.htm
(last
updated June 25, 2012).
94 Margaret A. Hamburg, 2013 FDLI Annual Conference, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm349118.htm (last updated Apr. 23, 2013); see also
Elizabeth M. Wroe & Philip S. Bonforte, September Sequester Surprise: FDA User Fees on the
Chopping Block, 10 PHARM. LAW & INDUS. REPORT 1332, 1332 (2012), available at
http://www.faegrebdc.com/webfiles/FDA_Bloomberg.pdf.
95 But see Seoane-Vazquez et al., supra note 44 (enumerating alternative explanations for
recent increase in orphan products); Marlene E. Haffner et al., Does Orphan Drug Legislation Really
Answer the Needs of Patients?, 371 LANCET 2041, 2041 (2008).
96 Haffner, supra note 46 at 824.
97 Id. at 821.
98 Search
Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/index.cfm (last visited December 13, 2013).
This number has now increased to 457 approved products in total of 3052 designated products. Id.
99 Paul D. Maher & Marlene Haffner, Orphan Drug Designation and Pharmacogenomics, 20
BIODRUGS 71, 72 (2006).
100 Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, supra note 50 (finding that the top ten biotechnology firms of
2008 only accounted for 12% of all biotech-sponsored products with orphan designations and, though
biotech firms account for roughly half of orphan-product approvals, the top ten firms only sponsor
15% of those products).
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broader industry.”101 Forty-three products with orphan designation
have exceeded $1 billion in annual revenue.102
In a 2012 study, Meekings found that the 2001–2010 compound
annual growth rate (“CAGR”) in orphan drug designations was
approximately 10%, compared with a negative CAGR for new
molecular entities (“NMEs”) overall for the same period.103 Meekings
reported that orphan drugs represented approximately 30% of NME
approvals in 2010.104 According to the study, orphan drugs have the
same revenue-generating potential as non-orphan drugs.105 This
analysis suggests that the impact of a smaller patient population is
offset by the higher pricing, the increased market share, the longer
exclusivity period, and the faster uptake rate that orphan drugs often
garner as a result of the high unmet medical need for many of these
diseases.106 Of the 192 drugs selected for the study, 15% had multiple
designations, and there was greater than a four-fold increase in profit
associated with having more than one orphan designation.107 While
some drugs that are first approved for non-orphan diseases
subsequently received designation for treatment of orphan disease,
roughly 75% of the studied drugs targeted an orphan disease
indication first.108
Slightly more than 8% of orphan drugs
subsequently received approval for treatment of larger non-orphan
diseases.109 Finally, using international data, the study also suggested
that clinical trials for orphan products are shorter and more
successful.110
Still, others have also posited that the costs associated with
research and development and marketing of orphan drugs are
significantly less than for standard drugs.111 Since most orphan drugs
are designated to treat serious or life threatening conditions, expedited
101 Katie Thomas, Making ‘Every Patient Counts’ a Business Imperative, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/business/orphan-drugs-for-rare-diseases-gain-popularitywith-pharmaceutical-companies.html?_r=0 (citing The Economic Power of Orphan Drugs, THOMSON
REUTERS (2012), http://thomsonreuters.com/products/ip-science/04_013/1001450.pdf).
102 Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, supra note 50 (noting that 18 products received approval solely
for an orphan indication and eleven of those reached $1 billion in sales within the exclusivity period,
including Gleevac). Additionally, for products with non-orphan indications, seven received orphan
designation during or following the year in which sales generated $1 billion. Id. tbl. 3.
103 Meekings et al., supra note 51, at 660.
104 Id.; but see Seoane-Vazquez et al., supra note 44 (finding that 115 of 635 NMEs (18.1%)
approved from 1983 to 2007 were for orphan indications).
105 Meekings et al., supra note 51, at 661.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 662.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 663. The results showed more than a one-year difference development time from
phase II to market and a 5% greater probability of success. Id.
111 André Côté & Bernard Keating, What Is Wrong with Orphan Drug Policies?, 15 VALUE IN
HEALTH 1185, 1189 (2012).
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review is available, as noted previously.112 Illustratively, in January
2001, imatinib (Gleevac®) received orphan drug designation for
treatment of chronic myelogenous leukemia.113 In a Phase I study,
remission was achieved in each of the first 31 patients treated.114
Under accelerated review, imatinib received FDA approval, with Phase
II trials still ongoing, in less than three months and was first marketed
in May 2001.115
Also, fewer research participants are enrolled in the studies;
smaller clinical trials have both positive and negative consequences.
In the late 1980s, severe combined immunodeficiency (“SCID”) was
estimated to affect approximately twelve patients in the U.S.; six
affected children were enrolled in a clinical trial of pegademase
(Adagen).116 Pegademase showed efficacy in each participant and was
subsequently approved by the FDA in 1990.117 The FDA can review
less data more quickly.118 Of competing concern, smaller data sets
result in less reliable conclusions regarding safety and efficacy.119
These efficiencies are offset to some degree by other factors as
well.120 Finding eligible research participants is an ongoing problem
for investigators involved in orphan-product development.121 The
relative scarcity often necessitates conducting trials in multiple
locations.
The disadvantages of using multiple sites include
maintaining consistency across centers, increased cost (e.g. travel), and
increased administrative time required for coordination across
multiple centers.122 In some cases, considerable burden is placed on
patients who travel a substantial distance to obtain treatment if it is
only available at a single site.123
Some trends emerged over the first twenty years of the ODA, “with
[approximately] 85% of orphan designations being used for the
treatment of serious and/or life-threatening diseases.”124 Oncology
products have received the highest percentage of orphan designations,
while metabolic disorders represent the second largest group.125
Approximately half of all orphan products were approved for pediatric
Haffner et al., supra note 46, at 823.
Maher & Haffner, supra note 99, at 76.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 75.
117 Id.
118 Haffner et al., supra note 46, at 823.
119 Id.
120 See generally, Erik Tambuyzer, Rare Diseases, Orphan Drugs and Their Regulation:
Questions and Misconceptions, 9 NATURE REVS. 921, 921–22 (2010).
121 Haffner et al., supra note 46, at 823.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 822.
125 Id. (31% for rare form of cancer, and 11% for metabolic disorders).
112
113
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use.126 Additionally, “nearly half of all the biological products that
ha[d] been approved for marketing in the [U.S. were] designated
orphan products.”127 As of 2002, approximately only 20% of orphan
designations were for novel biotechnology products.128 Genentech,129
Amgen,130 and Genzyme131 share the distinction of each having orphan
drugs as their first products to receive marketing approval.132
Companies such as BioMarin Pharmaceutical133 specialize solely in
orphan-product research and development.134
In 2001, the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) issued a report, concluding that the
implementation of the ODA had not raised significant access concerns,
though recognizing that the drugs can be expensive and in limited
supply.135 No regulatory or legislative changes were recommended at
that time.136 The ODA has been widely regarded as successfully
bringing therapies to market to treat rare diseases.137 At least one
Id.
Id.
128 Id.; but see Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, supra note 50, at 219, 221–22 (finding that of the 616
unique pharmaceutically active agents with orphan designation through 2009, 82% were NMEs).
129 Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals List as of 03-03-2014, HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/opa/programrequirements/orphandrugexclusion/orphandruglist.pdf
[hereinafter Designations and Approvals List]. Genentech has received 37 orphan designations and
15 approvals. Id.
130 Id. Amgen has received 36 orphan designations and 10 approvals. Id.
131 Id. Genzyme has received 39 orphan designations and 11 approvals. Id.
132 Haffner et al., supra note 46, at 824 tbl. 1 (noting that in 2002, Genzyme Corporation had
the most products with orphan designation, twelve; Amgen had eleven and Genentech had ten).
Since a single product may have multiple orphan designations, Roche had the most orphan
designations, twenty-two. Id. But only GlazoSmithKline had ten orphan marketing approvals. Id.
133 Designations and Approvals List, supra note 129.
BioMarin has received nine orphan
designations and three approvals. Id.
134 See About BioMarin, BIOMARIN, http://www.bmrn.com/about-us/index.php (last visited Apr.
13, 2014); Pipeline, BIOMARIN, http://bmrn.com/pipeline/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
135 OIG, ODA, supra note 65, at 9. Of note,
126
127

since 2010, orphan drugs have been partially exempted from the 340B Drug
Pricing Program. Under the 340B Program, safety-net health care providers pay
the same . . . discounted prices for drugs [paid by Medicaid programs]. The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expanded the list of entities eligible to
participate in the 340B Program . . . . Pursuant to section 204 of the Medicare and
Medicaid Extenders Act, these newly-added entities are not entitled to pay the
discounted 340B price for orphan drugs as long as those drugs are prescribed to
treat the orphan diseases for which they were approved.
Greenwood, supra note 47, at 4. “A House Democrat who worked on the healthcare law said the
situation had resulted from ‘an honest mistake in drafting,’ and he added, ‘No one intended to take
away any of the drug discounts that children’s hospitals already had.’” Robert Pear, Children’s
Hospitals Lose Some Drug Discounts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A18.
136 OIG, ODA, supra note 65, at 13.
137 Mark
A. Rothstein & Phyllis Griffin Epps, Ethical and Legal Implications of
Pharmacogenomics, 2 NATURE REVS. 228, 230 (2001); Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 344.

[13:667 2014]The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

686

scholar has urged no changes be made to the Act, in response to
infrequent instances of perceived abuse, because of the legislation’s
unique success in achieving the desired result.138
Still, the ODA has not been without some controversy. In 1986,
Amgen’s first product, epoetin alfa (Epogen), received orphan
designation and FDA approval to treat anemia associated with endstage renal disease.139 Whether by intentional business strategy or
not, new off-label uses were subsequently identified for the product, as
there were numerous foreseeable applications beyond end-stage renal
disease. In fact, Epogen became the sixth best-selling drug in the
U.S.140 This method of seemingly arbitrary subdivision of a larger
disease into smaller subgroups eligible for ODA incentives has been
dubbed “salami slicing.”141 To prevent such behavior, the ODA
formerly had required companies to demonstrate that a proffered
subset was medically plausible.142 As such, though the National
Cancer Institute estimates that 921,780 people are currently living
with melanoma in the U.S.,143 the cancer has more than fifty orphan
drug designations.144 In 2011, the FDA published a proposed rule in
response to confusion related to the meaning of a “medically plausible
subset.” Of the 324 requests for orphan-drug designation in 2010, 124
were denied or placed in abeyance pending response to deficiencies,
and seventy-nine (64%) of those failed to identify an appropriate
medically plausible subset of a population with a non-rare disease or
condition.145 BIO and others have long requested more guidance from
the FDA as to how to define subsets, particularly those based on
genetic profiles.
The final rule was published on June 12, 2013 and became effective
August 12, 2013.146 The FDA affirmed the effectiveness of the ODA as
implemented:
Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 345.
Search Orphan Drug and Designations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://fda.gov (follow
“For Industry” hyperlink; then follow “Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions”
hyperlink; then follow “Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals” hyperlink; then search
“Epogen” in “Product Name”; then follow “Run Search” button; then follow “Row Num 1” hyperlink).
140
Sacrificing the Cash Cow, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 363 (2007), available at
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v25/n4/pdf/nbt0407-363.pdf. Epogen, as of 2007, is the most
successful biotech drug. Id. Three other instances are often cited as indicative of a windfall in
profitability: AZT (initially only to treat AIDS but demonstrated benefit in HIV-positive patients as
well); pentamidine isethionate (pneumonia associated with AIDS), and human growth hormone
(hGH) (improper growth in children lacking the enzyme). Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 316–17.
141 Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 315.
142 David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A
Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 365, 374 (2005).
143 SEER
Stat Fact Sheets:
Melanoma of the Skin, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/melan.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
144 Meekings et al., supra note 51, at 664.
145 Orphan Drug Regulations, supra note 67, at 35,130.
146 Id. at 35,117.
138
139
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FDA continues to believe that the current framework is the
best means for giving effect to the intent of the Orphan Drug
Act, to provide incentives for sponsors to develop promising
drugs for rare diseases and conditions that would not otherwise
be developed and approved, including drugs that are
potentially safer and more effective than already approved
drugs.147
Yet, in an effort to clarify misinterpretation surrounding the necessary
demonstration required to establish an appropriate subgroup, the
“medically plausible” language was stricken from the relevant
regulation, in favor of the new definition of an orphan subset.148 The
FDA stressed that an orphan subset is a regulatory concept rather
than a medical determination.149
While not altering existing
practice—the manner in which such subsets previously had been
reviewed—the FDA announced that “eligibility for orphan subsets
rests on whether use of the drug in a subset of persons with a non-rare
disease or condition may be appropriate but use of the drug outside of
that subset . . . would be inappropriate owing to some property(ies) of
the drug.”150 Therefore, an orphan subset cannot be considered
without reference to the test article, irrespective of what medical
science may suggest about the proffered insularity of the disease-state
itself.
A comment expressed concern regarding the difficulty surrounding
proof of a negative—a showing that the drug, in fact, was not suited for
the wider disease population. The FDA responded, focusing on the
affirmative evidence of effectiveness in the limited segment of the
disease population and noting that the evidence need not necessarily
rise to the level of “scientific proof.”151 The FDA explicitly confirmed
that orphan subsets may be informed by biomarkers and other
targeted treatments.152 The FDA, with BIO’s support, also explicitly
affirmed that a drug that has demonstrated benefit in multiple rare
Id. at 35,122.
Id. at 35,119.
149 Id. (“It is intended to make clear to sponsors that an orphan subset is a regulatory concept
specific to the Orphan Drug regulations, and that it does not simply mean any medically
recognizable or clinically distinguishable subset of persons with a particular disease or condition.”).
150 Id. at 35,119. The FDA identified three factors that may inform whether an appropriate
subset exists: toxicity of the drug, mechanisms of drug action, and previous clinical experience.
Whereas, clinical trial eligibility, the sponsor’s plan to study the drug for a select indication, the
particular disease grade or stage, and price are not, by themselves, typically sufficient indicia to
support orphan subsets. Id. at 35,120.
151 Id. at 35,120.
152 Id. at 35,121 (recognizing, by the FDA, that “orphan subsets may be predicated on
biomarker-based and other targeted treatments as a principle for limiting the use of a drug to only a
subset of patients with a non-rare disease or condition . . . .”).
147
148
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diseases may be eligible for multiple designations, even if the
cumulative prevalence would exceed 200,000.153
The FDA did
recognize potential uncertainty regarding what constitutes a distinct
disease and pointed to several factors to consider, including:
pathogenesis, course of the disease, prognosis, and resistance to
treatment.154
The FDA also expressed concern with the potential for
“evergreening” or consecutive exclusivity periods for the same
indication of the same drug without any meaningful benefit to the
patient.155 This concern centers primarily on the clinical superiority
exception to orphan designation—such a showing required to prevent
evergreening.156 In rebuttal to the proposed rule, BIO first asserted
that the FDA’s interpretation of clinical superiority unnecessarily
conflates grant of the exclusivity period with orphan drug designation,
the latter of which would entitle the company to the other development
incentives.157 BIO contended that allowing multiple designations in
the same space would obviate the need for demonstrating clinical
superiority—a difficult standard—and would result in more
competition.158 It is dubious to assume that, as a sound business
model, companies would habitually enter an orphan market with an
anticipated equivalent product and no opportunity to obtain market
exclusivity.
BIO also expressed concern over the uncertainty of proof required
to satisfy the “comparable” and “major contribution” components of
clinical superiority because, at the time of the orphan designation
request, it is often too early in the development process to speculate as
to whether the molecule will have comparable efficacy and safety to an
approved product.159 BIO urged that “comparable efficacy and safety
to an approved product should therefore not be used as a criterion for
orphan designation.”160 While considering the feasibility of a guidance
document, the FDA rejected the comments advocating the elimination
153 Id. at 35,120 (“A drug that shows promise in multiple, different rare diseases or conditions
may be eligible for multiple designations, one for each disease or condition, because FDA considers
the prevalence within each disease or condition . . . even if the cumulative prevalence of all three
diseases or conditions would exceed 200,000.”).
154 Id.
As an example, the FDA indicated that pneumonia in cystic fibrosis patients is
considered to be distinct from community-acquired pneumonia when evaluating orphan drug
designation. However, the FDA currently considers stage 1 breast cancer to be the same disease as
stage 4 breast cancer. Id. The final rule points out the fluidity of these determinations based on the
state of the science at the time of designation. Id. at 35,120–21.
155 Id. at 35,127; see also Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New
Drugs, 29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 876 (2011).
156 See 21 C.F.R. § 316.34(c) (2013).
157 Letter from Biotechnology Industry Organization to the U.S. Food & Drug Administration,
Comments on Proposed Rules related to “Orphan Drug Regulations” 2 (Jan. 17, 2012).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 6.
160 Id.
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of the requirement for a plausible hypothesis of clinical superiority
when rendering the orphan designation determination.161
The final rule explains that the FDA interprets the FDCA to not
permit orphan designation where there is an equivalent drug in the
same space, approved for the same use.162 The FDA clarified that a
drug may still be considered clinically superior without demonstrating
greater effectiveness or safety—though comparable—if it makes a
“major contribution to patient care.”163 For example, new dosage forms
may be “clinically superior.”164 The FDA confirmed that the same
sponsor may receive market exclusivity upon showing clinical
superiority to its own product.165 The FDA also explained that a
sponsor need not provide a plausible hypothesis of clinical superiority
for a distinct subset, if another subset within the wider disease has
already obtained orphan designation.166 It was further emphasized
that the grant of marketing exclusivity for an orphan drug must meet
a higher bar; clinical superiority actually must be demonstrated.167
Last, and not surprisingly, the final rule does not address the cost
of orphan products, which has left some patients without insurance
coverage.
For example, Oregon makes Medicaid coverage
determinations essentially based on a health technology assessment,

161

Orphan Drug Regulations, supra note 67, at 35,122.

In the absence of a clinical superiority hypothesis, the Agency does not interpret the
Orphan Drug regulations to permit designation of a drug that is otherwise the same as a
drug that is already approved for the same use, regardless of whether the previously
approved drug obtained orphan-drug designation or was eligible for orphan-drug
exclusivity.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 35,123.
164 Id. (“Some new dosage forms may be ‘clinically superior’ to previously approved dosage
forms of the same drug under § 316.3(b)(3) and thus eligible for their own 7-year period of orphan
exclusive approval.”).
165 Id. at 35,122.
166 Id. at 35,124.
162
163

If a drug is approved for only certain indications or uses within a rare disease or
condition, a subsequent sponsor may obtain designation of the same drug for the
remaining . . . indications or uses within the same rare disease or condition
without having to provide a plausible hypothesis of clinical superiority over the
already approved drug, provided the prevalence of the entire disease or condition
remains under 200,000.
Id.

167 Id. at 35,122 (“FDA advises sponsors that the clinical superiority requirements for orphandrug designation and orphan-drug exclusivity are different: designation requires a plausible
hypothesis of clinical superiority, exclusivity requires a demonstration of clinical superiority.”).
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weighing cost with effectiveness.168 Illustratively, “[t]he Commission
reviewed the treatment of Hunter’s syndrome with enzyme
replacement therapy and found it to have a minimal effect on the
patient’s health at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year.”169
As a result, such enzyme replacement therapies (“ERTs”) for rare
diseases generally are not covered under Oregon’s Medicaid program,
as they fall outside the current priority lines that demarcate
coverage.170
V. INTERNATIONAL TREATMENT OF ORPHAN DRUGS
The perceived success of the ODA has seen other countries adopt
similar measures. Japan passed such legislation in 1993, and the
European Union followed in 1999.171 Briefly, by way of comparison,
the term “drug gap” describes the difference in drugs approved in other
jurisdictions, as compared to the U.S.172 Such disparities result from
differences in the definition of rarity—defined in the EU as less than
five per 10,000 people.173 There are also distinctions in the durations
168 See generally, Arti K. Rai, Pharmacogenetic Interventions, Orphan Drugs, & Distributive
Justice: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19 J. SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 246, 254 (2001) (explaining a
brief cost-benefit analysis).
169 See OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM’N., PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES 26 (2009),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/oha/OHPR/HSC/docs/r/09hscbiennialreport.pdf.
170 See Prioritized List of Human Services, OREGON HEALTH PLAN l.264, 684 (2013),
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/herc/PrioritizedList/10-1-2013%20Prioritized%20List%20of%20
Health%20Services.pdf. Oregon currently covers prioritized lines 1 – 498. Id. at GN-18. With the
exception of infantile Pompe disease (line 264), ERT falls in line 684 (of 692 total lines). Id.
Therefore, as a matter of budgetary constraint, this technology, though FDA approved, is generally
unavailable through the Oregon Health Plan. Id.; AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
ENZYME-REPLACEMENT THERAPIES FOR LYSOSOMAL STORAGE DISEASES, EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE
PROGRAM 12 (Jan. 2013), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK117219/pdf/TOC.pdf [hereinafter ERTS
FOR LYSOSOMAL STORAGE DISEASES]. There are, in fact, nine ERTs approved by the FDA for the
treatment of rare diseases, as of January 2013. Id. tbl.1.
171 Haffner et al., supra note 46, at 824. Singapore, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong
Kong, South Africa, Turkey, and India also have orphan drug regimens. Aarti Sharma et al.,
Orphan Drug: Development Trends and Strategies, 2 J. PHARMACY & BIOALLIED SCI. 290 (2010),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2996062/. Canada hopes to soon adopt
similar measures. Id.; Harper Government Takes Action to Help Canadians with Rare Diseases—
Launch of First Ever Canadian Framework to Increase Access to New Treatments and Information
and Orphanet-Canada Online Portal, ABOUT HEALTH CAN. (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/_2012/2012-147-eng.php [hereinafter Harper Government]. At least one
author has argued that Canada should not adopt a U.S.-based system. Id.; Matthew Herder, When
Everyone Is an Orphan: Against Adopting a U.S.-Styled Orphan Drug Policy in Canada, 20
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES.: POL’YS & QUALITY ASSURANCE 227 (2013).
172 See Drug Lag & Drug Loss, Glossary, INDEP. INST., http://www.fdareview.org/glossary.shtml
#drug_lag (last visited Apr. 13, 2014); John Matthews & Lucas Glass, The Effect of Market-Based
Economic Factors on the Adoption of Orphan Drugs Across Multiple Countries, 47 THERAPEUTIC
INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 226 (2013).
173 Sharma et al., supra note 171.
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of market exclusivity, with Japan providing ten years and Australia
allowing five years.174 Of note, a “clawback” provision exists in the EU
version that permits a reduction in the statutory exclusivity period if
the orphan drug becomes sufficiently profitable within the protected
time; it has never been used.175
Greater harmonization across borders has been recommended.176
Since both the European Medicines Agency (“EMA”) and the FDA
require submission of annual reports after orphan drug designation
but prior to marketing approval, an optional process was announced in
2010, which allows for a single filing.177 The concerted inter-agency
collaboration may portend or warrant defining the relevant market
beyond merely those affected with a particular condition in the U.S.
but, rather, by reference to every jurisdiction in which the
manufacturer seeks to enter the market. Interestingly, many of the
highly prevalent infectious diseases endemic to developing nations
have been reduced to rare disease prevalence in the U.S. and,
therefore, are eligible for orphan designation. In this way, the firstand second-line anti-tuberculosis drugs rifampin and rifapentine
received orphan designation, yet have significant world-wide
applicability.178 In essence, this would keep the U.S. from subsidizing
the cost of drugs in countries where price controls limit the amount
that can be charged. However, such a process would prove unwieldy
and ignores social and distributive justice considerations by potentially
restricting dispersion of life-saving therapies.
VI. REPURPOSED MOLECULES
It has been argued that the ODA has successfully revived
previously discarded treatments.179
Illustratively, despite the
teratrogenic effects that resulted in the 1960s when the sedative was
prescribed in Europe for nausea associated with pregnancy,
thalidomide received FDA approval in 2006 as an orphan drug for the
treatment of multiple myeloma, after receiving initial approval in the

Id. tbl.4.
P.M. Barrett et al., Cystic Fibrosis in an Era of Genomically Guided Therapy, 21 HUMAN
MOLECULAR GENETICS R66, R70 (Oct. 15, 2012), available at http://hmg.oxfordjournals.org/
content/early/2012/09/17/hmg.dds345.full.pdf; see also Greenwood, supra note 47, at 10.
176 See Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, supra note 50, at 221.
177 Press Release, European Meds. Agency, FDA & EMA Agree to Accept a Single Orphan Drug
Designation Annual Report 1 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/
docs/en_GB/document_library/Press_release/2010/03/WC500074890.pdf.
178 Maher & Haffner, supra note 99, at 76.
179 Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, supra note 50, at 226. A 2010 study identified 26 discontinued
products that later received orphan designation, 14 of which ultimately received market approval
(including Vioxx). Id.
174
175
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U.S. for the treatment of leprosy.180 “Repurposing” generally refers to
studying a small molecule or a biologic approved by the FDA to treat
one disease or condition to see if it is safe and effective for treating
other diseases.181
There are many different strategies for repurposing molecules and
many players in the space.182
The NIH’s National Center for
Advancing Translational Sciences (“NCATS”) implemented a program
in May 2012, titled Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing
Molecules (“DNTUEM”).183 NCATS oversees a program designed
specifically for rare diseases, Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected
Diseases (“TRND”). Additionally, the FDA created a database of
known molecular targets, the Rare Diseases Repurposing Database
(“RDRD”), which indexes orphan designations and approvals.184 The
private sector has also taken notice. Pfizer partnered with Washington
University to reposition off-patent products and, also, has established
an internal Indication Discovery Unit (“IDU”) to reposition
underutilized assets.185
GlaxoSmithKline has made available
approximately 500 patents to a patent pool.186 Also, Gilead has made
180 Thalidomide
(marketed as Thalomid) Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/u
cm107296.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Thalidomide Information]; see also
Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/milestones/ucm128305.htm (last visited Apr. 13,
2013).
181 Rescuing and Repurposing Drugs, NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI.,
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/rescue-repurpose.html
(last
visited Oct. 15, 2013). This is distinguished from drug “rescue,” which refers to research using small
molecules and biologics that previously were used in studies but not further developed and
submitted for FDA approval. Id.; Sheryl G. Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved to Treat Leprosy, With
Other Uses Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/17/us/thalidomideapproved-to-treat-leprosy-with-other-uses-seen.html. Illustratively, having never received approval
in the U.S., thalidomide was approved for the treatment of leprosy in 1998. Id.; see also
Thalidomide Information, supra note 180.
182 See generally Ramaiah Muthyala, Orphan/rare drug discovery through drug repositioning,
8 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY: THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES 71, 72 (2011).
183 Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules, NAT’L CTR. FOR ADVANCING
TRANSLATIONAL
SCIENCES,
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescuerepurpose/therapeutic-uses/therapeutic-uses.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
Numerous
pharmaceutical companies provided 58 compounds to the program and, in June 2013, NIH awarded
$12.7 million to fund nine projects. Id.; Ann M. Thayer, Drug Repurposing, 90 CHEMICAL & ENG’G
NEWS 15 (2012), available at http://cen.acs.org/articles/90/i40/Drug-Repurposing.html?h=1031248274 (“The NCATS program has garnered praise but also debate. One issue is around
government support of corporate product development. In the program, a research partner will own
new intellectual property (IP) that it generates, but the company that owns the compound will have
the first right to develop it.”).
184 See generally Muthyala, supra note 182, at 73; see also A Valuable Resource for Drug
Developers: The Rare Disease Repurposing Database (RDRD), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/HowtoapplyforOrph
anProductDesignation/ucm216147.htm (last updated June 17, 2013).
185 Muthyala, supra note 182, at 74.
186 Id.
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available medicines through voluntary licensing for research into the
possibility of repositioning.187
Exploring the utility of repositioning, a consultant concluded that
“the identification of common mechanism of action that allow
repositioning from one indication to another are attractive.”188 In
addition to the stockpile of chemical entities (estimated to be 9,000
compounds189 ), it is also estimated that the well of unsuccessful drug
candidates increases at the rate of 150 to 200 compounds per year.190
Drug repositioning was “expected to generate up to $20 billion in
annual sales in 2012.”191 In addition to this value, drug repositioning
has a number of R&D advantages including: reduced research and
development (R&D) timelines by up to three to five years, reduced
development cost (due to the likely availability of clinical safety,
toleration, and efficacy data), and improved probability of success.192
Thompson Reuters estimates a 15% increase in rate of success for
bringing products to market from Phase II and III trials, as compared
to new molecular entities; the rates for repurposed compounds are 25%
and 65%, respectively193 The RDRD lists 236 repurposed products
with orphan designation and 127 compounds with marketing
approval.194
Thus, repurposing has become a prominent drug
development strategy, particularly with advances in bioinformatics.
Of course, the strategy is not without risk. Problematically, a
product that moves from a common to an orphan disease may incur
lower production costs, but a sponsor may find it difficult to recoup the
costs of the clinical trials in the new indication, due to the existing
prices of the originator.195 Also, there is a significant likelihood for
physicians to prescribe the cheaper original brand or generic instead of
the newly developed orphan drug.196
Due to substantial price
Id.
Caroline Mathie, Orphan Drug Repositioning—To or From a More Common Disease?,
PHARMAPHORUM (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.pharmaphorum.com/articles/orphan-drug-repositioning%E2%80%93-to-or-from-a-more-common-disease (noting the examples Sutent and Gleevac, for
which the indications expanded beyond the original orphan diseases of renal cell carcinoma and
CML, respectively).
189 Muthyala, supra note 182, at 72.
190 Id.; see also JOHN ARROWSMITH & RICHARD HARRISON, DRUG REPOSITIONING: BRINGING
NEW LIFE TO SHELVED ASSETS & EXISTING DRUGS 19 (Michael J. Barratt eds., 1st ed. 2012),
available at http://media.johnwiley.com.au/product_data/excerpt/74/04708782/0470878274-101.pdf .
191 THOMSON
REUTERS, KNOWLEDGE-BASED DRUG REPOSITIONING TO DRIVE R&D
PRODUCTIVITY 1 (2012), available at http://thomsonreuters.com/business-unit/science/subsector/pdf/
knowledge-based-drug-repositioning-to-drive-rd-productivity.pdf (citing Tobinick E.L., The Value of
Drug Repositioning in the Current Pharmaceutical Market, 22 DRUG NEWS & PERSPS. 119 (2009)).
192 Id. (citing Ted T. Ashburn et al., Drug Repositioning: Identifying and Developing New Uses
For Existing Drugs, 8 NATURE REVS. 673 (2004)).
193 Id. fig.1.
194 Muthyala, supra note 182, at 74.
195 Mathie, supra note 188.
196 Id.
187
188
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increases in just such situations, recent disputes have garnered much
publicity concerning the ODA’s application to repurposed molecules or,
for the purpose of this paper, drugs available to patients prior to
orphan designation and FDA approval for marketing as such. Two
detailed case studies follow.
A. Case Study: Makena® and KV Pharmaceuticals
First approved in 1956 under the trade name Delalutin, 17αhydroxyprogesterone caproate (“17P”), was indicated for the treatment
of gynecological conditions, such as uterine adenocarcinoma and
menorrhagia.197 In 1999, Bristol-Myers Squibb requested and the FDA
granted withdrawal of its market approval for Delalutin.198 In 2003, a
seminal study demonstrated the clinical effectiveness of 17P in
preventing premature birth in pregnant women with a history of
spontaneous preterm delivery.199 The recommendation was adopted by
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”),
and the use of 17P became the standard of care by 2005.200 Seventeen
alpha-hydroxyprogesterone caproate is the dominant treatment to
prevent preterm birth in pregnant woman with a history of preterm
delivery; there are no other available treatments.201 Since 17P had
never been approved for this use and it was no longer commercially
available, prescriptions were filled for the sterile injectable through
compounding pharmacies.202 The price of compounded 17P was $15
per injection, for a cost per pregnancy of approximately $315.203
197 Determination that Delalutin Injection, 125 mg/ml and 25 mg/ml, Was Not Withdrawn from
Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,419, 36,419 (June 25, 2010),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-06-25/html/2010-15416.htm [hereinafter Delalutin Injection];
see also Greenwood, supra note 47, at 7.
198 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 7.
199 Paul
J. Meis et al., Prevention of Recurrent Preterm Delivery by 17 AlphaHydroxyprogesterone Caproate, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2379, 2739 (2003), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa035140.
200 Michelle Oxman, What Does the Makena Story Tell Us About the Orphan Drug Act?,
WOLTERS KLUWER L. & HEALTH (Sept. 24, 2012), http://health.wolterskluwerlb.com/2012/09/whatdoes-the-makena-story-tell-us-about-the-orphan-drug-act/.
201 A.O. Odibo et al., 17α-hydroxyprogesterone Caproate for the Prevention of Preterm Delivery:
A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 108 J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNACOLOGY RES. 492 (2006).
202 Yesha Patel & Martha M. Rumore, Hydroxyprogesterone Caproate Injection (Makena) One
Year Later, 37 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 405, 405 (2012). In light of recent events involving
tainted sterile injectables from compounding pharmacies in Massachusetts and Georgia, the
question about the benefits of FDA approval and current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs) are
particularly apropos, having wider implications for product consistency assumptions between stateregulated compounding pharmacies and FDA-regulated manufacturers.
Scott Gottlieb,
Compounding a Crisis at FDA, FORBES (May 24, 2013, 8:59 A.M.), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/scottgottlieb/2013/05/24/compounding-a-crisis-at-fda/. New legislation should grant the FDA
more authority over large-scale compounding. Id.
203 Patel & Rumore, supra note 202, at 406.
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On May 6, 2006, KV Pharmaceutical (“KV”)204 submitted a NDA
seeking approval to market 17P for “women with a singleton
pregnancy and a history of preterm birth, to reduce the risk of another
preterm birth.”205 It was estimated that approximately 150,000
pregnant women per year present with a prior preterm delivery.206
The drug received orphan drug designation on January 5, 2007 and
was approved for marketing, under the trade name Makena, on
February 3, 2011.207 Also on February 3, 2011, the FDA denied a
citizen petition from the Sidelines National Support Network, seeking
revocation of Makena’s orphan-drug designation.208
Both the compounded and branded products contain the same
active ingredients suspended in castor oil and are administered
prophylactically in weekly 250mg doses, via intramuscular injection,
commencing at sixteen weeks of gestation and continuing through
week thirty-six or delivery, whichever occurs first.209 At the urging of
KV, the FDA investigated claims that compounded products were
impure and not potent, ultimately declining to make such a categorical
determination.210 However, of note, there is some indication that 17P
was not utilized as pervasively as it might otherwise have been if
marketed by a pharmaceutical company.211 KV set the price of the
204 KV Pharmaceutical had a significant history of noncompliance, including violation of good
manufacturing practices and distribution of misbranded and adulterated drugs, which was followed
by both a de-listing warning from the NYSE due to falling stock price and a securities fraud action
brought by a class of investors. See Oxman, supra note 200; United States v. KV Pharm. Co., No.
4:09 CV 334 RWS, ¶ 3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/Selecte
dEnforcementActionsonUnapprovedDrugs/UCM245157.pdf; Nate Raymond, U.S. Court Revives KV
Pharmaceutical Investor Suit, REUTERS (June 4, 2012, 5:23 P.M.), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/06/04/us-kvpharmaceutical-investors-idUSBRE85312N20120604; Pub. Pension Fund
Grp. v. KV Pharm. Co., No. 4:08-CV-1859 (CEJ), 2013 WL 1293816, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2013).
205 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 7.
206 Oxman, supra note 200.
207 Makena Results, Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2.cfm?Index_Number
=218706 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
208 Letter from Leslie Kux, Acting Assistant Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to
Candace Hurley, Exec. Director, Sidelines Nat’l Support Network 1 (Feb. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480e6e38c&disposition=attachment&
contentType=pdf; Greenwood, supra note 47, at 7. Sidelines National Support Network is “a nonprofit organization providing international support for women and their families experiencing
complicated pregnancies and premature births.” Greenwood, supra note 47, at 7.
209 Patel & Rumore, supra note 202, at 405, 407.
210 Updated FDA Statement on Compounded Versions of hydroxyprogesterone caproate (the
active ingredient in Makena), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 15, 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm308546.htm.
Finding suboptimal potency in a small percentage of those tested, the FDA stated: “[a]lthough the analysis of
this limited sample of compounded hydroxyprogesterone caproate products and APIs did not identify
any major safety problems, approved drug products, such as Makena, provide a greater assurance of
safety and effectiveness than do compounded products.” Id.
211 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 14.
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drug at $1,440 per injection, for a cost per pregnancy of approximately
$30,240.212 As a result of the cost, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH)
wrote to KV requesting reconsideration of the “massive” price increase,
and, on March 17, 2011, questioned FDA Commissioner Margaret
Hamburg on the subject.213 Also on that day, Senators Brown and
Klobuchar (D-MN) sent a letter to FTC Chair Jon Leibowitz alleging
anti-competitive behavior in the pricing structure.214
The outcry over the cost of Makena intensified because the drug’s
sponsor relied on government-funded research to obtain FDA approval
(such funding unrelated to the research tax credit associated with the
ODA.215 Reimbursing a manufacturer for research costs paid for
through initial public investment remains controversial.216 On March
30, 2011, the FDA issued a press release in which it explained, “KV
Pharmaceuticals, the drug’s owner, received considerable assistance
from the federal government in connection with the development of
Makena by relying on research funded by the National Institutes of
Health to demonstrate the drug’s effectiveness.”217
The agency
concluded:
In order to support access to this important drug, at this time
and under this unique situation, FDA does not intend to take
enforcement action against pharmacies that compound
hydroxyprogesterone caproate based on a valid prescription for
an individually identified patient unless the compounded
products are unsafe, of substandard quality, or are not being
compounded in accordance with appropriate standards for
compounding sterile products. As always, FDA may at any
time revisit a decision to exercise enforcement discretion.218
On March 30, 2011, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) issued a statement announcing that compounded 17P could be
Id. at 8.
Letter from Sherrod Brown, U.S. Senate, to Greg Divis, Chief Exec. Officer, KV Pharm. Co.
(Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.brown.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Makena%20Letter.pdf;
Brown to Grill FDA Commissioner on Massive Price Increase for Drug that Prevents Premature
Labor,
SHERROD
BROWN
SEN.
FOR
OHIO
(Mar.
17,
2011),
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-to-grill-fda-commissioner-on-massiveprice-increase-for-drug-that-prevents-premature-labor.
214 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 8 n.40; Letter from Sherrod Brown & Amy Klobuchar to the
Honorable Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, PROJECT VOTE SMART (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://votesmart.org/public-statement/595790/#.UrPE1vSrxDg.
215 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 8. KV contends that those funds amounted to only a small
percent of the total development expenditure. Id. at 8 n.41.
216 Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The Prevalence and Cost of Unapproved Uses of Top-selling
Orphan Drugs, 7 PLOS ONE e31894, at *7 (2012).
217 FDA
Statement on Makena, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/newsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm249025.htm.
218 Id.
212
213
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reimbursed by Medicaid, providing coverage guidance to states, and
recommending the International Academy of Compounding
Pharmacists locator service.219 On July 5, 2012, KV filed suit,
“challenging the FDA’s decision to decline to take enforcement action
against pharmacies that compound 17P.”220 The court declined to
exercise jurisdiction over an FDA press release.221 KV did initiate
successful litigation against numerous states to ensure coverage.222
Confronted with the availability of compounded 17P and Makena,
payers have adopted every possible reimbursement approach.
Currently, formularies cover: (1) compounded 17P only; (2) Makena
with step therapy, requiring that compounded 17P be used first; (3)
Makena and 17P; or (4) Makena only.223 Due to insufficient data to
support the compounded product and additional inherent compounding
risks, Oregon Health Authority prefers the branded product over the
compounded product.224 United Healthcare supports the physician’s
discretion to use compounded preservative-free 17P, if the prescribing
practitioner has determined that a compounded product is necessary
for the particular patient and would provide a significant difference for

219 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 9; see also Letter from Cindy Mann, Director, Ctr. for
Medicaid, CHIP & Survey & Certification (CMCS), to States (Mar. 30, 2011), available at
http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/CMCSBulletins/downloads/Makena-CMCSInfo-Bulletin-03-30-2011.pdf.
220 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 9.
221 K-V Pharm. Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 889 F. Supp. 2d 119, 133 (2012).
On
September 6, 2012, the District Court granted the FDA’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, “finding that the FDA’s issuance of the Press Release was an unreviewable action.”
Greenwood, supra note 47, at 9. KV appealed, averring:

“[n]ever before has FDA publicly authorized and encouraged compounders to produce
and distribute nationwide unapproved, uncustomized drugs to replace an FDA-approved
drug” and arguing that “the statutory and regulatory restrictions on compounding serve
important patient-safety goals because only approved drugs have been shown to be
effective and safe in clinical trials, are manufactured under strict FDA-approved
controls, have FDA-approved labeling, and are subject to FDA’s post-approval
requirements and oversight.”
Id. at 9–10.
222 Ed Silverman, KV Pharma Finally Wins a Victory, For Now, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2012, 1:06
P.M.),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edsilverman/2012/08/13/kv-pharma-finally-wins-a-victory-fornow/; Jim Doyle, KV Pharmaceutical Suing for Survival, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 2, 2012,
12:15 A.M.), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/kv-pharmaceutical-suing-for-survival/article_
098f5b0c-f3a6-11e1-bad1-001a4bcf6878.html.
223 Patel & Rumore, supra note 202, at 408.
224 See Oregon Health Plan Policies, Rules and Guidelines:
Clinical Information, OREGON
HEALTH AUTH., http://www.dhs.state.or.us/policy/healthplan/guides/pharmacy/clinical.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2014); Brandy Fouts, Drug Use Evaluation: 17 alpha-hydroxyprogesterone caproate,
OR. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF PHARMACY (May 2013), http://pharmacy.oregonstate.edu/drug_policy/
sites/default/files/pages/dur_board/evaluations/articles/2013_05_30_Makena_NDE.pdf.
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the patient as compared to the FDA-approved commercially available
drug product, Makena.225
KV Pharmaceuticals may soon face additional competition in the
market. After seeking a declaration that Delalutin was not withdrawn
for safety or efficacy concerns,226 McGuff Pharmaceuticals submitted
an ANDA, intending to market a generic version of Delalutin.227 KV
Pharmaceutical filed a petition with the FDA in June 2012, urging the
FDA not to approve the application as a violation of the exclusive
marketing rights for Makena.228 The FDA rejected the petition:
FDA’s approval of an ANDA for a generic version of Delalutin
would not violate Makena’s orphan-drug exclusivity because
orphan-drug exclusivity applies only to the indication for which
the orphan drug has been designated and approved. In other
words, should FDA approve an ANDA referencing Delalutin as
the RLD, FDA will not be approving a drug application
proposing the same drug and the same use as Makena.229
In response to the competition, KV eventually announced that it
had decided to reduce the list price of Makena by approximately 50% to
$690, or $14,490 for the standard twenty-one doses, and to expand
patient financial assistance.230 On August 4, 2012, KV filed voluntary
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in light of the competition from compounding
pharmacies.231 Ultimately, by not fully enforcing the ODA’s seven-year

225 See Updated Information about 17 Alpha-Hydroxyprogesterone Caproate (17P) Injection,
UNITED HEALTHCARE 2, https://www.unitedhealthcareonline.com/ccmcontent/ProviderII/UHC/enUS/Assets/ProviderStaticFiles/ProviderStaticFilesPdf/Clinician%20Resources/Womens%20Health/M
akena_17P_Overview.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
226 Delalutin Injection, supra note 197, at 36,419.
Note that while current safety and
effectiveness data are considered, current standard of care does not play a role in such analysis.
Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Res., U.S. Food & Drug Amin., to
Michael J. Jozwiakowski, Vice President, KV Pharm. Co. 8 (Jan. 2, 2013), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064811a56b7&disposition=attachment
&contentType=pdf [hereinafter Letter from Woodcock].
227 Letter from Ronald M. McGuff, President/CEO, McGuff Pharm. Inc., to U.S. Food & Drug
Admin. 1 (Sept. 19, 2012).
228 Letter from Gregory J. Divis, President/CEO, KV Pharm. Co., to U.S. Food & Drug Admin.
1 (Nov. 12, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/api/contentStreamer?objectId=
090000648116f3d3&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
229 Silverman, supra note 222; see also Letter from Woodcock, supra note 226. The Fourth
Circuit foreclosed a foreseeable intended use theory, asserting that “a foreseeable off-label use
[theory] to bar the approval of generic drugs, even for unprotected indications . . . [would add] a
huge evidentiary hurdle to the generic drug approval process [and] would be profoundly
anticompetitive.” Id. at 7 (citing Sigma-Tau Pharms. Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir.
2002)). This scenario clearly illustrates the advantage of a drug substance patent over market
exclusivity. Id.
230 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 9.
231 Id.

[13:667 2014]

Adopting Pharmacogenomics and Parenting Repurposed
Moledules under the Orphan Drug Act: A Cost Dilemma?

699

exclusivity period, the FDA preserved affordability.232 In so doing, the
agency undermined sponsor expectation with significant economic
fallout, invited litigation, and fanned the flames of debate concerning
the appropriate balance between incentivizing research and ensuring
access to the fruits of that innovation.
B. Case Study: H.P. Acthar® Gel and Questcor Pharmaceutical
H.P. Acthar Gel stands as another example of a repurposed
molecule, a previously available drug awarded orphan designation for
a new indication, only to result in a significant price increase. It also
demonstrates that—though possibly infrequent—the strategy
employed by KV Pharmaceuticals is not an isolated occurrence. The
adrenocorticotropic hormone or ACTH, a biologic, was developed by a
division of Armour & Company, a meatpacking company, in
conjunction with Nobel Laureate researchers at the Mayo Clinic.233
The FDA approved the biologic to treat multiple sclerosis and other
indications in 1952.234 In 1995, Rhône-Poulenc, which became Aventis
and eventually merged with Sanofi, opted to discontinue production
rather than invest in manufacturing improvements required by the
FDA as a result of numerous quality control problems.235 However, a
limited supply was rationed to treat only infantile spasms (also known
as West syndrome, a rare and potentially fatal epileptic disorder with
an onset generally before the age of one) or severe flare-ups of multiple
sclerosis, with the company losing several million dollars a year on the
biologic.236

232 Id. at 14.
Interestingly, on August 8, 2012, the FDA, for the first time, revoked the
exclusivity period conferred to an orphan drug. Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm. For Policy,
U.S. Food and Drug Admin. to Peter Turner, President, CSL Behring 1–2 (Aug. 8, 2012), available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064810c8c71&disposition=attach
ment&contentType=pdf. The biologic, Wilate, is manufactured by Octapharma and used to treat
bleeding associated with von Willebrand disease. Id. at 5. In response to a citizen petition and
though the FDA had originally found it hypothetically plausible that Wilate was superior to
Humate-P, the FDA reversed its prior decision. Id. at 1–2, 16. However, the FDA determined that
Wilate could retain the orphan designation because it had shown a hypothetical plausibility at the
time of submission of the application—after all, the FDA believed the evidence to satisfy the
standard on first blush. Id. at 5–6.
233 Andrew Pollack, Finding Profits, at $28,000 a Vial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, at BU1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/business/questcor-finds-profit-for-acthar-drug-at28000-a-vial.html?pagewanted=all.
234 Samson, supra note 72, at A14.
Other estimates place the pre-2007 cost of Acthar at
$2,062.79 per vial. Jacob Gettig et al., H.P. Acthar Gel and Cosyntropin Review: Clinical and
Financial Implications, 34 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 250, 250 (2009), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2697107/pdf/ptj34_5p250.pdf.
235 Pollack, supra note 233.
236 Id.
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Questcor Pharmaceutical bought the rights to the biologic from its
previous owner for $100,000 in 2001 (as well as a 1% royalty on annual
sales over $10 million) and immediately raised the price of H.P. Acthar
Gel from a reported low of $40 a vial.237 In 2003, while widely
prescribed for this purpose, H.P. Acthar Gel, one of only the company’s
few products, received designation as an orphan drug for the treatment
of infantile spasms, with an estimated prevalence of 2,000
individuals.238 Although sales of H.P. Acthar Gel totaled $12 million
per year by 2006, the company remained unprofitable.239
Consequently, without a diverse product portfolio, Questcor began
selling a vial for $28,000 in 2007, amounting to approximately
$150,000 per regimen.240 Then, in July 2008, the U.S. Senate Joint
Economic Committee held a special hearing, titled “Small Market
Drugs, Big Price Tags: Are Drug Companies Exploiting People with
Rare Disease?”241 Senator Schumer began the hearing, stating:
One might[] say that a brand new drug that just hit the market
might be pricey because it had to recoup research and
development expenditures, but Acthar has been on the market
for three decades. . . . Our witnesses today are going to shine a
light on practices that look uncomfortably like an abuse of the
pricing power we give to drug companies. In case after case, it
appears that PHARMA companies have been taking critical
drugs that have been on the market for years—with the costs
of their development long since paid for—and increasing prices
to the very highest levels the market will bear.242
Testimony described substantial drug pricing increases, as much
as by 3,436% in one instance.243 After rejection of its first attempt,
Questcor finally received both marketing approval for the biologic in
connection with the treatment of infantile spasms and marketing
exclusivity in 2010.244
However, there is evidence that H.P. Acthar Gel might not be the
most cost-effective treatment. It has been reported that studies
Id.
Samson, supra note 72, at A14.
239 Pollack, supra note 233.
While complex, manufacturing accounts for approximately one
cent of every dollar that Questcor charges for Acthar. Id.
240 Id.
241 Small Market Drugs, Big Price Tags: Are Drug Companies Exploiting People with Rare
Disease?: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., 110th Cong. 1–37 (2008).
242 Id. at 6 (statement of Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Sen. N.Y.).
243 Id. at 31 (statement of Madeline Carpinelli, Res. fellow & Stephen W. Schondelmeyer,
Professor and Dir., Prime Inst., Coll. of Pharmacy, Univ. of Minn.).
244 See Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2.cfm?Index_Number=168103
(last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
237
238
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showing H.P. Acthar Gel to be more effective than less expensive
steroids used sub-optimal doses of steroids.245
One hospital
successfully treated eighteen of thirty babies with a high-dose oral
steroid for two weeks, at a cost of $200.246 Only the twelve who did not
respond were prescribed H.P. Acthar Gel, with five successfully
treated.247 The approach reportedly saved more than $2 million.248
The attending physician commented that the hospital has an
obligation to monitor the cost to the healthcare system and make
responsible decisions.249
Additionally, Questcor began marketing the drug for the other
approved indications: multiple sclerosis, nephrotic syndrome, and
rheumatologic conditions.250 Since Acthar was approved for such use
before the FDA required clinical trials to demonstrate efficacy—Acthar
has grandfather status—there is similarly little evidence
demonstrating cost effectiveness over cheaper alternatives for these
uses.251 As a result, Questcor did not have the expense or time
commitment of clinical trials to demonstrate efficacy.252 A spokesman
for the company reportedly stated that the new price of H.P. Acthar
Gel was set to make the company viable, based solely on sales for
infantile spasms; executives assumed at the time that the high price
would preclude other uses.253 The company began to sponsor more
studies with H.P. Acthar Gel, which was not possible until the drug
became financially viable.254 In addition to the new research, Questcor
operates a free drug program, ensuring improved accessibility in
contrast to when the product was cheaper but often in short supply.255
Pollack, supra note 233.
Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. A physician reported that a hospital at which he had privileges maintained a policy not
to hospitalize a child with spasms without first seeking pre-authorization; in practice, however, no
child was reportedly turned away due to financial reasons. Id.
250 Id.
A course of treatment for nephrotic syndrome can run $250,000, while a shorter
treatment for a multiple sclerosis relapse typically costs $40,000. Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. “[A] study that . . . sought to determine whether multiple sclerosis patients who did
not have a good response to steroids should be treated with either another round of steroids or with
Acthar [was terminated] midway through “to analyze data,” according to the summary of the trial on
the federal clinical trial database.” Id. It is hypothesized that a published “negative result could
have jeopardized already growing sales for multiple sclerosis.” Id. The company responded that
“the trial fell hopelessly behind its goal in recruiting patients.” Id. This highlights a new trend in
clinical studies called adaptive trials. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
ADOPTIVE DESIGN CLINICAL TRIALS FOR DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 1–2 (Proposed Official Draft
Guidance 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/UCM201790.pdf.
255 Pollack, supra note 233. Questcor has assistance programs for patients who cannot afford
the drug; the company helps with insurance co-payments, to ensure that a patient’s inability to pay
245
246
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However, while access programs stave off consumer protests, Questcor
can simply shift the associated cost onto payers.256
According to the New York Times article, approximately “10
percent of the drug’s sales are for infantile spasms.”257 The new uses
represent significant opportunity for H.P. Acthar Gel and Questcor,
and a representative indicated that Questcor does not intend to
develop other products.258
“Sales of Acthar, which account for
essentially all of Questcor’s sales, totaled nearly $350 million in the
first nine months [of 2012], up 145 percent from the period a year
earlier.”259 “In the five years [following the H.P. Acthar Gel] price
increase in August 2007, Questcor shares rose from around 60 cents to
about $50, in one of the best performances of any stock in any
industry.”260 A Questcor representative stated, “‘[w]e could lower the
price and make less money . . . and then we would be sued by our
shareholders.’”261 However, in September, the shares plummeted after
Aetna indicated it would no longer pay for H.P. Acthar Gel, “except to
treat infantile spasms, because of lack of evidence the drug worked for
other diseases.”262
Yet, there may soon be competition in this space too. Novartis,
which sells a synthetic version under the trade name Synacthen in
Europe, has applied for a U.S. trademark.263
Also, Cerium
Pharmaceuticals recently received U.S. orphan-drug designation for
Synacthen in the treatment of infantile spasms.264 While it seems
apparent that repurposing of drugs and biologics under the ODA has
impacted the cost of medication, a larger threat to the affordability of
prescription drugs potentially looms.
VII. PHARMACOGENOMICS (PGX)
The ODA potentially has broader ramifications for healthcare costs
when viewed through the prism of genomic science. An individual’s
genome plays a significant role in disease susceptibility and drug

does not inhibit use of the drug. Id. A staff of thirty—about one staff member for each of the
roughly thirty prescriptions it gets in a typical day for all uses—is tasked with working on insurance
reimbursements. Id. NORD also operated a patient assistance program with discounts up to 100%.
Samson, supra note 72, at A15.
256 Pollack, supra note 233.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
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response.265 For example, at opposite ends of the spectrum, people
potentially can be identified as poor metabolizers (“PMs”) or ultrarapid
metabolizers (“UMs”) of specific drugs based on the known biochemical
pathways.266
Genetic tests or biomarkers can inform these
classifications.267 Pharmacogenomic data has already resulted in
changes to FDA-approved labeling.268
In applying standard
pharmacology to genomics, pharmacogenomics (“PGx”) will be a
substantial driver in the personalized medicine revolution.269 PGx
refers broadly to the study of drug exposure and/or response as related
to variations in DNA and RNA characteristics.270 “Drug exposure
refers
to
the
[pharmacokinetic
(“PK”)]
profile
following
administration.”271 “Drug response refers to the [pharmacodynamics
(“PD”)] response to the drug; that is, all of the effects of the drug on
any physiologic and pathologic processes, including those related to
effectiveness and those related to adverse reactions.”272 According to
the FDA, “[t]he promise of pharmacogenomics lies in its potential to
help identify sources of inter-individual variability in drug response
265 Liewei Wang et al., Genomics and Drug Response, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1144, 1144 (2011).
While certainly, social determinants of disease also play a significant role, as do other
environmental factors. Genomics and Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/genomics/public/ (last updated July 29, 2013).
266 Pharmacogenomics and its Role in Drug Safety, 1 FDA DRUG SAFETY NEWSL. 12, 24 (2008),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugSafetyNewsletter/ucm109169.pdf;
see also Jai Shah, Concept and Putative Application of Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics, 12
HEALTH L. REV. 3, 5 (2004).
267 See
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
CLINICAL
PHARMACOGENOMICS:
PREMARKET EVALUATION IN EARLY-PHASE CLINICAL STUDIES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LABELING 3 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM337169.pdf [hereinafter FDA
CLINICAL PHARMACOGENOMICS].

It is [the] FDA’s position that if a companion diagnostic is required for therapeutic
selection, an FDA-approved or -cleared test will be required at the same time that
the drug is approved. An in vitro PGx test would be considered a companion
diagnostic device if it will provide information that is essential for the safe and
effective use of a therapeutic product as directed in labeling.
Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
268 Cetuximab/K-ras is such an example. Table of Pharmacogenomic Biomarkers in Drug Labeling,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm083378.htm (last
updated Jan. 22, 2014). The Warfarin and VKORC1 interaction is another prominent example. Id.
269 Hong-Guang Xie & Felix W. Freuh, Pharmacogenomics Steps Toward Personalized
Medicine, 2 PERSONALIZED MED. 325, 325 (2005).
270 FDA CLINICAL PHARMACOGENOMICS, supra note 267; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E15 DEFINITIONS FOR GENOMIC BIOMARKERS, PHARMACOGENOMICS,
PHARMACOGENETICS, GENOMIC DATA AND SAMPLE CODING CATEGORIES 3 (2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm07
3162.pdf.
271 FDA CLINICAL PHARMACOGENOMICS, supra note 267, at 4 (emphasis in original).
272 Id. (emphasis in original).
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(both effectiveness and toxicity); this information will make it possible
to individualize therapy with the intent of maximizing effectiveness
and minimizing risk.”273 In this manner, the use of pharmacogenomics
fulfills the intent of the ODA by incentivizing industry investment in
diseases that impact a small number of patients.
Pharmacogenomics will likely have significant implications for
clinical trials.274 The potential for parallel trials targeting various
subgroups could increase business costs related to FDA approval.275
Also, it has been suggested that manipulation of safety and efficacy
data based on preferential selection of research participants into
particular cohorts with advantageous genetic markers could skew
results, particularly since submission of pharmacogenomic data is not
required by the FDA.276 If so, demonstrations of clinical superiority,
which do not require a new chemical entity, could become highly
susceptible to the inclusion and exclusion of particular research
participants from the test and control groups.277
Consequently,
Loughnot suggests that clinical superiority should be demonstrated
using cohorts of research participants with similar genetic profiles to
avoid manipulation of trial results and unwarranted extension of ODA
incentives.278
Moreover, pharmacogenomics implicates the ODA by enabling a
sponsor to request orphan-drug designation for use of that drug in a
subset of persons with a disease or condition that may not otherwise be
rare. The manner in which FDA’s purpose has been to establish safety
and efficacy on a population scale, PGx promises to ensure safety and
efficacy on the individual level.279 Medical science will be able to
273 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA
SUBMISSIONS 2 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucm126957.pdf.
274 See generally Loughnot, supra note 142, at 375–76.
275 Jai Shah, Economic and Regulatory Considerations in Pharmacogenomics for Drug
Licensing and Healthcare, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 747, 749 (2003) (noting the possible
conundrum created by the identification of drugs with major benefit to few and marginal benefit to
many and the extent to which payers will cover such treatments in light of cost-effectiveness
analyses).
276 Loughnot, supra note 142, at 366–67; FDA PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS, supra
note 273, at 5.
277 Loughnot, supra note 142, at 366–67.
278 Id. at 379.
279 See generally FDA PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS, supra note 273 at 3; Michael M.
Hopkins et al., Putting pharmacogenetics into practice, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 403, 406 (2006),
http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v24/n4/pdf/nbt0406-403.pdf. The general challenges to the FDA’s
regulatory process will likely require significant adaptation. Submission of PGx data is currently
encouraged, although voluntary. FDA PHARMACOGENOMIC DATA SUBMISSIONS, supra note 273, at
4. Increased costs incidental to verification in increasingly diverse sub-classifications of research
participants may weigh in favor of post-market efficacy surveillance, as balanced against the ethical
considerations of distributive justice in demonstrating safety in all possible classes. See generally
Deepak Gupta, Pharmacogenomics in Drug Discovery and Development, 2 J. OF DEVELOPING DRUGS
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identify disease subsets using biomarkers. Since the pathogenesis of
disease is often multi-factorial, the same disorder could be subdivided
into classifications based on unique genetic signatures, such as single
nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”).280 Illustratively, a subpopulation
of patients with various forms of cancer expresses the HER2 oncogene,
which the monoclonal antibody, trastuzumab, was designed to
inhibit.281
In this manner, pharmacogenomics shares many
similarities with orphan products.282 Pharmacogenomics has been
instrumental in the growth of orphan drug designations, and, like
orphan drugs, is being used most widely in connection with cancer
therapeutics.283 Two brief case studies follow.
A. Case Study: Kalydeco® and Vertex Pharmaceuticals
In the U.S., approximately 30,000 people have cystic fibrosis,
caused by mutations in the cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance
regulator (CFTR) gene that transports chloride ions across cell
membranes.284 Those afflicted have a propensity to collect mucus in
the lungs, resulting in infections and lung damage.285 The average life
expectancy is 37 years.286 Kalydeco (ivacaftor), developed by Vertex
Pharmaceuticals, targets a specific mutation (G551D) in the gene that
accounts for 4%—or approximately 1,200—of cystic fibrosis cases in the
U.S.287 Kalydeco received orphan-drug designation on December 20,

1,
1–2
(2013),
http://www.omicsgroup.org/journals/pharmacogenomics-in-drug-discovery-anddevelopment-2329-6631.1000e126.pdf.
280 Alain Vignal et al., A Review on SNP and Other Types of Molecular Markers and Their Use
in Animal Genetics, 275 GENETICS SELECTION EVOLUTION 275, 278 (2002), available at
http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1297-9686-34-3-275.pdf. A SNP is a DNA sequence
variation occurring when a single nucleotide—A, T, C or G—in the genome differs between paired
human chromosomes. Id. at 277–78. “[T]he spontaneous mutation rate . . . occurs at each genetic
locus with a frequency of approximately 1 per 100,000 per generation.” Jess G. Thoene, Curing the
Orphan Drug Act, 251 SCI. 1158, 1158 (1991).
281 Shah, supra note 275, at 747; see also Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2
.cfm?Index_Number=129399 (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (stating that Herceptin is known generically
as trastuzumab).
282 Shah, supra note 275, at 749; see also Wouter Boon & Ellen Moors, Exploring Emerging
Technologies Using Metaphor—A Study of Orphan Drugs and Pharmacogenomics, 66 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 1915 (2008).
283 Loughnot, supra note 142, at 366–67, 380.
284 Andrew Pollack, FDA Approves New Cystic Fibrosis Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at
G551D, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/business/fda-approves-cystic-fibrosisdrug.html?_r=0.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
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2006 and market approval and exclusivity on January 31, 2012.288 The
relevant patents will run through approximately 2026,289 well beyond
the exclusivity period which expires in 2019. The duration of the FDA
approval process exceeded expectation, coming nearly three months
prior to the target deadline.290 “The FDA . . . based its approval on two
placebo-controlled studies involving a combined 213 patients [over 48
weeks].”291 Kalydeco will cost an estimated $294,000 a year.292
Vertex received $75 million from the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation,
“an example of how patient advocacy groups have been taking a more
direct role in drug development”—particularly in the orphan space—in
what has been referred to as “venture philanthropy.”293 The president
of the foundation explained that the contribution to Vertex was
intended to establish a working relationship and to lower the risk
associated with development of products for rare diseases.294 The
pharmaceutical company was also able to avail itself of the
foundation’s patient registry and established network of care centers,
facilitating participant enrollment in clinical trials.295 In return,
Vertex agreed to pay royalties to the foundation, money from sales of
the drug that reportedly will be reinvested in additional research.296
B. Case Study: Xalkori® and Pfizer
Xalkori (crizotinib), a tyrosine kinase inhibitor that blocks the
anaplastic lymphoma kinase (“ALK”) enzymes that can stimulate
cancer growth, is an oral drug indicated for the treatment of
approximately five percent of those with non-small cell lung cancer
(“NSCLC”).297 An estimated 45,000 patients worldwide are diagnosed
with metastatic ALK-positive NSCLC every year.298 The drug is
developed and manufactured by Pfizer, and the corresponding patents
288 Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2.cfm?Index_Number=228306
(last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
289 See Generic Kalydeco Availability, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/availability/generickalydeco.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Generic Kalydeco Availability]; see also U.S.
Patent No. 8,410,274 (filed Jan. 26, 2012).
290 Pollack, supra note 284.
291 Id.; see also Barrett et al., supra note 175, at R5.
292 Pollack, supra note 284.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 See Care Center Network, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., http://www.cff.org/LivingWithCF/
CareCenterNetwork/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
296 Pollack, supra note 284.
297 Xalkori—Treatment
for
Non-Small
Cell
Lung
Cancer,
DRUGDEVELOPMENTTECHNOLOGY.COM,
http://www.drugdevelopment-technology.com/projects/xalkori---treatment-fornonsmall-cell-lung-cancer/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Xalkori].
298 Id.
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will run through approximately 2025.299 Xalkori obtained orphan drug
designation for this indication in September 2010,300 and received fast
track designation in December 2010.301 Pfizer filed a NDA in March
2011, and the FDA approved the drug for the treatment of ALKpositive NSCLC on August 26, 2011.302 The approval was based on
data from 255 patients enrolled in two then-ongoing clinical trials that
had begun in January 2010.303 Xalkori received FDA approval in less
than five months—only four years from identification of the target—
and “represent[s] the first time that a targeted cancer therapeutic was
approved . . . based on Phase I data.”304 Clinical trials showed a
median gain of 5.1 months in progression-free survival compared with
standard therapy.305
The researchers initially spent six years
investigating the molecule’s interaction with another gene in gastric
tumors but were redirected by a publication in Nature describing the
role of the ALK fusion gene in NSCLC, resulting in a shift in the gene
target and the patient population.306 Pfizer’s president of worldwide
R&D touted the “remaining commercial potential in inhibiting the
ALK translocation, with several additional indications currently in
Phase I trials, and Pfizer’s ongoing exploration of Xalkori’s other
targets.”307

299 See Generic Xalkori Availability, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/availability/genericxalkori.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Generic Xalkori Availability]; see also U.S.
Patent No. 7,825,137 (filed Nov. 23, 2006).
300 See Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2.cfm?Index_Number=310610
(last visited Mar. 9, 2014). Crizotinib has two additional orphan designations from 2012, for
treatment of anaplastic large cell lymphoma and neuroblastoma. See Search Orphan Drug
Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2.cfm?Index_Number=379712 (last visited Mar. 9, 2014);
Search Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/OOPD_Results_2.cfm?Index_Number=379812
(last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
301 Xalkori, supra note 297.
302 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND BIOPHARMACEUTICALS
REVIEW(S)
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/
2011/202570Orig1s000ClinPharmR.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2011 NOVEL NEW DRUGS 14
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Drug
Innovation/ucm293663.pdf. Xalkori also received marketing exclusivity as a new chemical entity,
which runs through 2016. Generic Xalkori Availability, supra note 299.
303 Xalkori, supra note 297297.
Objective response rates (ORR) between 50 and 60% were
observed. Id.
304 Chris Morrison, Pfizer’s Dolsten Sees a Bright Future for Xalkoi and Pfizer Oncolcogy, THE
IN VIVO BLOG (Feb. 15, 2012, 4:22 P.M.), http://invivoblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/pfizers-dolsten-seesbright-future-for.html.
305 Selina McKee, Final NICE ‘No’ for Pfizer’s Xalkori, PHARMATIMES (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/13-09-25/Final_NICE_no_for_Pfizer_s_Xalkori.aspx.
306 Morrison, supra note 304.
307 Id. (including c-MET and recently disclosed ROS1).
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In the U.S., a regimen of the Xalkori—two pills daily—costs
approximately $80,000.308
The pathology service to determine
individual applicability costs approximately $1,500, including $250 for
the biomarker test itself.309
Most managed care organizations
reimburse for Xalkori.310
“[T]hree-quarters of surveyed U.S.
oncologists prescribe Pfizer’s Xalkori for the treatment of [NSCLC] just
10 months after the drug’s launch, illustrating the power of a targeted
agent with a strongly predictive biomarker to achieve usage, despite a
small eligible patient population.”311
After submitting a marketing authorization application for Xalkori
to the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in August 2011, Pfizer
received conditional approval from the Eurpoean Commission (EC) for
the treatment of advanced NSCLC in October 2012.312 However,
despite EMA approval and recognition of clinical effectiveness, the
UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has
determined that the drug is not cost effective as compared to existing
therapies and has declined to cover the drug as part of the National
Health Service.313 Pfizer responded: “the UK’s limited and slow-paced
adoption of innovative medicines such as crizotinib poses a real threat
to both the government’s goal to have UK cancer outcomes among the
highest in Europe and its vision to make the UK a world leader in life
sciences.”314
308 Matthew Herper, Gene Test For Pfizer Cancer Drug to Cost $1,500 Per Patient, FORBES
(Aug. 29, 2011, 12:29 P.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2011/08/29/gene-test-forpfizer-cancer-drug-to-cost-1500-per-patient/; see also J. Leonard Lichtenfeld, Crizotinib Approval For
Lung Cancer Shows Our Miracles Aren’t Getting Less Expensive, DR. LEN’S CANCER BLOG (Aug. 30,
2011), http://www.cancer.org/aboutus/drlensblog/post/2011/08/30/crizotinib-approval-for-lung-cancershows-our-miracles-arent-getting-less-expensive.aspx (showing crizotinib (Xalkori®) costs $115,200
per year).
309 Herper, supra note 308.
The expense of the test is weighed against the cost-savings of
increased efficacy, reduced sequela, and increased adherence. Shah, supra note 275, at 749. Of
note, an author describes the potential cost of defensive medicine, with the impulse to order a
myriad of genetic tests prior to treatment in order to avoid malpractice liability. Id. at 751. Another
foreseeable difficulty involves the recalibration of the risk/benefit analysis in the circumstance of
last resort treatments. Id.
310 For the Treatment of Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer (NSCLC), Three-Quarters of Surveyed
U.S. Oncologists Prescribe Pfizer’s Xalkori Just 10 Months After the Drug’s Launch, DECISION RES.
(June 19, 2012), http://decisionresources.com/News-and-Events/Press-Releases/Breast-Cancer-NonSmall-Cell-Lung-Cancer-061912.
311 Id.
312 Xalkori, supra note 297.
313 NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH AND CLINICAL EXCELLENCE, CRIZOTINIB FOR PREVIOUSLY
TREATED NON-SMALL-CELL LUNG CANCER ASSOCIATED WITH AN ANAPLASTIC LYMPHOMA KINASE
FUSION GENE, 38 (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/live/14282/65275/
65275.pdf. NICE concluded that the cost per Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for Xalkori
compared with docetaxel would be more than £100,000 per QALY gained, and compared with best
supportive care more than £50,200 per QALY gained, and so far and beyond what is normally
considered a cost effective use of NHS resources. Id. at 34.
314 McKee, supra note 305.
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VIII. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT
Legislative amendments have been proposed to cure the perceived
ills of the ODA, employing both prospective and retrospective
approaches. As a retrospective tactic, an amendment proposed in 1992
would have made continued exclusivity conditional upon maintaining
total profits below a $200 million threshold after a two year period.315
Exceeding the threshold, inclusive of revenue generated from off-label
uses, would have resulted in loss of exclusivity.316 Other amendments
proposed different triggers, including the termination of marketing
exclusivity once the rare disease population exceeded 200,000
individuals.317 Loughnot has criticized this proposal because sponsors
potentially would be disincentivized to develop treatments for
conditions affecting close to 200,000 people, for fear of prematurely
losing exclusivity.318 Still other proposed amendments have relied
upon the particularized cost of developing the drug as the benchmark
for calculating tax owed—all related profits exceeding the threshold
taxed significantly so as to prevent the perceived windfall.319 The
same author challenged the wisdom of these approaches, as
administratively unwieldy and anathema to the secrecy maintained by
the pharmaceutical industry with regard to costs and profits.320
Additionally, Loughnot noted that the actual cost of any given drug
often incorporates estimated development expenses associated with
failed drugs.321 Finally, he lamented that a windfall tax would only
result in pass-through costs paid by patients and payors.322
Instead of post-hoc adjustments in the Act’s scheme, preventative
measures have also been proposed. In November 1990, both houses of
Congress passed an amendment which would have required analysis of
the level of industry interest in development of the putative orphan
drug to encourage competition where present—yet discouraging a “me
too” approach; the bill was vetoed by then-President Bush.323 Of note,
Pulsinelli, supra note 31 at 332.
Id.
317 Id. at 323 (noting this would have affected AIDS treatments, such as AZT, for which the
affected population grew well past 200,000 after FDA already had conferred orphan designation).
318 Loughnot, supra note 143 at 378. Though, one might argue such a scheme would—in this
burgeoning era of shared responsibility in healthcare—provide the greatest incentive to create
extremely effective treatments and active investment in their continued success.
319 Pulsinelli, supra note 31, at 336.
320 Loughnot, supra note143, at 378.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Orphan Drug Amendments of 1990, H.R. 4638, 101st Cong. (1990).
315
316

As proposed, such an amendment would have permitted simultaneous licensing of
the same orphan product for the same indication if (i) the second company
requests orphan designation within 6 months of publication by the FDA of its
action to designate the drug for the first company; (ii) the second company
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Wellman-Labadie and Zhou found a correlation between a slowdown in
orphan approvals and the proposed amendments of the early 1990s,
suggesting the sensitivity of the market to the uncertainty associated
with legislation aiming to curtail incentives.324 It is clear that the
drafters of any changes to the incentive structure of the ODA must be
judicious so as not to stifle progress in the development of these
products, as rare disease remains an area with significant unmet need.
IX. CONCLUSION: THE NEW ORPHANS?
Numerous policy proposals have been proffered to curtail the
perceived abuses and extravagancies of the ODA, as it has been
applied to and exploited in industry. As noted above, suggestions have
included shortening the exclusivity period, allowing for limited
competition during the exclusivity period, implementing a cap on drug
prices, and levying a tax on manufacturer profits.325 In an effort to
increase application scrutiny, Loughnot identified the ODA’s nebulous
definition of clinically superior as possible vehicle for systematically
circumscribing the ODA’s incentives.326 It has also been suggested the
FDA confer market exclusivity on a case-by-case basis, considering
such factors as the extent to which the company’s investment ought to
be rewarded, the degree to which the application for marketing
approval relies on government research, and the degree to which the
drug responds to an unmet or important public health need.327 Surely,
the lack of certainty in any amorphous standard or retroactive
approach would quickly draw the ire of industry, stymie venture
capital investment on the front end, and further delay a process which
is already complex and protracted.
The cost of orphan products remains controversial and
symptomatic of the wider inflationary trend of healthcare costs. Based
on the case studies detailed above, it is reasonable to inquire as to true
initiates human clinical trials not more than 12 months after the first company
initiated clinical trials; and (iii) the second company submits an approvable new
drug application to the FDA no more than 1 year after the first company submits
its new drug application.
Thoene, supra note 280, at 1159; David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of
Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 137 (2000).
324 Wellman-Labadie & Zhou, supra note 50, at 220 (noting a second slowdown in orphan
product approvals during the 2000 recession that stifled start-up capital).
325 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 11–13.
326 Loughnot, supra note 142, at 366.
327 See generally Greenwood, supra note 47 at 1–14 (assessing the merits of calibrated
incentives); Wills Hughes-Wilson et al., Paying for the Orphan Drug System: Break or Bend? Is it
Time for a New Evaluation System for Payers in Europe to Take Account of New Rare Disease
Treatments, 7 ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES 1, 5 (2012), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3582462/.
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significance and impact of market exclusivity for orphan products.
True monopoly power deriving from the ODA is likely only created in a
small percentage of cases. Through market exclusivity, the ODA alone
bars competition—to the extent that it would otherwise exist due to
the small market—only for those drugs that are off-patent and
generally repurposed.328 Barring expensive litigation, Kalydeco and
Xalcori will remain under patent after market exclusivity expires.329
Seoane-Vazquez found a positive but modest overall impact of
exclusivity on monopoly power for new molecular entities under
patent.330
Even in the case of H.P. Acthar Gel, Questcor was able to raise
price owing to the unmet need, prior to and in anticipation of receiving
market exclusivity.331 Market exclusivity certainly provides an added
barrier to entry for would-be competitors but, even then, only where
there are no other FDA-approved indications.332 Despite the rarity of
repeat preterm labor, a generic manufacturer hopes to enter the
market and will compete—assuming an advantageous price point—
with Makena through off-label prescriptions.333 H.P. Acthar Gel, too,
appears likely to face competition based on the potential for a follow-on
company to market unprotected, yet nonetheless FDA-approved,
indications. Furthermore, the more new uses discovered, the larger
the market and the greater the likelihood that competitors will be
drawn to the space--such new indications not necessarily protected by
exclusivity.334
Though both case studies involving repurposed
molecules do demonstrate the possibility of competition in small
328 Randall Morin et al., Adopt IP Protections to Ensure Regulatory Exclusivity for Orphan
Drugs, 31 ASSOC. OF CORPPRATE COUNSEL 79, 83 (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.choate.com/uploads/1178/doc/ACC_Docket_-_Adopt_IP_Protections_to_Ensure_
Regulatory_Exclusivity_for_Orphan_Drugs.pdf. This statement excludes those drugs that never
received FDA approval for their original purpose prior to patent expiration, conceivably allowing for
market exclusivity once FDA approval is received for that original purpose—without being
repurposed. Id. Also, it will be interesting to monitor whether the pharmaceutical industry will
make a concerted push to obtain orphan designation for new indications of drugs that have recently
or will soon go off patent, in an attempt to extend monopoly pricing.
329 Generic Xalkori Availability, supra note 299; Generic Kalydeco Availability, supra note 289 .
330 Seoane-Vazquez et al., supra note 44 (showing that “only 1 in 10 NME Orphan drugs
benefited directly from the ODA exclusivity” and monopoly power is extended by only 0.8 years on
average beyond patent expiration).
331 Pollack, supra note 233. The ability to raise price without market exclusivity might also
have been enabled by the complexity of manufacturing such a biologic and any trade secrets
involved in that process.
332 It would not seem prudent or inspire investor confidence for biotech firms to forego patent
protection in sole reliance on FDA exclusivity, to avoid the costs associated with patents.
333 See Current Progress Towards ANDA Approval of Hydroxyprogesterone Caproate Injection,
USP, MCGUFF PHARMS. INC. (June 13, 2013, 5:01 P.M.), http://www.mcguffpharmaceuticals.com/
About/hydroxyprogesterone-caproate-injection.aspx.
334
If the original manufacturer receives exclusivity for the new indication or clinically
superior form of the product, there will be no price competition until a competitor is able to and
enters the market for the original indication.

[13:667 2014]The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

712

markets, it is not clear that competition created by market forces alone
would sufficiently contain prices.
Off-patent, repurposed molecules will generally always have an
indication of which a manufacturer may take advantage to compete
indirectly with an orphan product at some point in that branded
product’s exclusivity period. With the increasing impact of evidencebased medicine and cost-effectiveness research at both the prescriber
and payor levels, there is reason to hope that the most efficient
treatments will be utilized. Increasingly, healthcare providers will
have both vested financial interests in clinical efficiency and access to
health outcomes data that will continue to augment simple reliance on
FDA approvals for specific indications, since the FDA has no authority
to control prescribing practices of FDA-approved drugs. In fact, a
recent study investigated four orphan drugs and found that nearly
$500 million of revenue was generated from off-label sales.335 While
not to suggest that all money spent on off-label drugs resulted from
favorable competition and resulted in clinical efficiencies,336 the
market is not insignificant.
Nonetheless, as the two case studies involving pharmacogenomics
exemplify, industry has successfully pursued treatments for rare
disease, but the ODA is not responsible for the exorbitant expense of
new orphan drugs. Rather, the small market size and, often, longer
patent terms drive pricing. Small markets both demand higher prices
and inherently resist competition, the latter keeping prices elevated.
Concurrent market exclusivity provides qualitative protection over
patent rights but often does not itself enable monopoly pricing for new
drugs. Thus, any alteration of the length of the market exclusivity
would not seem to have a dramatic impact on orphan-product pricing.
The apparent dilemma specifically concerning the application of
the ODA and resultant cost of drugs and biologics involves repurposed
molecules. Of note, pharmacogenomics does not entirely negate the
issue of repositioning. While it might seem inherent in the notion of
personalized medicine that therapies will not be as amenable to
repurposing—obviating need for reform looking forward—many genespecific drugs are, in fact, not individual or even disease specific—
particularly in cancer therapeutics—allowing for the possibility of
repositioning and monopoly pricing after patent expiration.337
Additionally, it has been observed that while “[d]rugs designed to
address a specific genetic deficit or replace a missing enzyme or
protein, including all of the enzyme replacement therapies . . . have
Kesselheim et al., supra note 216, at 6.
In fact, the case study involving H.P. Acthar Gel indicates that much of the prescriptions
were not based on persuasive scientific evidence.
337 This obviously does not consider the possibility of new-use patents. Kirk Teska, What Are
Improvement Patents and New Use Patents?, NOLO (2014), http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/improvement-patents-new-use-patents-30250.html.
335
336
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little potential for true repurposing . . . [they] may be repositioned to
embrace variants of the original disease as they are identified.”338
Furthermore, pharmacogenomics can be utilized to reevaluate failed
drug candidates through review and genetic profiling of research
participants.339
Clearly consistent with the current framework of rewarding
invention, the novel repositioning of a known drug, to treat rare
disease or otherwise, warrants meaningful incentives and protections
to spur such investment. Problematically, however, as demonstrated
in the two case studies involving repurposed molecules, the uses were
previously known and had become standard of care.340 In both
instances, the price increases dramatically upset market expectation,
and to what end? Under such circumstances, the ODA primarily
incentivizes FDA oversight, rather than development of and access to
orphan products. Yet, again, the FDA traditionally is not concerned
with cost or cost-effectiveness.341 In performing a cost-benefit analysis
of the ODA’s incentives, it is important to understand what value FDA
oversight confers. FDA approval confirms safety and efficacy to the
level required by governing regulations, demands compliance with
good
manufacturing
practices
(“GMPs”),
necessitates
pharmacovigilence, and potentially increases access through
permissible marketing. Yet, was the ODA implemented to funnel
existing treatments—though off-label—through the regulatory
process? Also, is the value created by such oversight, as applied to
repurposed molecules for which the use is already widespread,
commensurate with the incentives provided for by the ODA, including
seven years of market exclusivity? At least one author has concluded
Mathie, supra note 188.
Shah, supra note 275, at 749–50.
340 Sheldon Bradshaw, former chief counsel of the FDA, decried the FDA’s decision not to
enforce KV’s market exclusivity, as against compounding pharmacies. Sheldon T. Bradshaw et al.,
Did FDA Apply a Remedy Worse than the Disease in Refusing to Clear the Market of Unapproved
Versions of Makena?, 1 FDLI’S FOOD & DRUG POLICY FORUM 1, 4 (2011), available at
http://www.fdli.org/docs/default-document-library/fdli-policy-forum-11.pdf?sfvrsn=0. In so doing, the
authors equate the exercise of enforcement discretion with undermining the FDA’s mission, going so
far as to rhetorically suggest that cheap drugs could be best obtained through abolition of the FDA.
Id. Yet, the article fails to draw an important distinction between less expensive Makena and the
two other examples cited, Elaprase and Cerezyme. Id. The relative price of the drugs should not be
a determinative concern. Significantly, neither of the analogized drugs was previously available in
the market. Mr. Bradshaw also worried that such discretion would effectively chill investment in
the orphan space. Id. While difficult to quantify the degree of possible opportunity loss, use of the
ODA has continued to increase in prevalence; tending to debunk this concern. While it is true that
FDA should enforce exclusivity as against pharmacies that either compound a previously
unavailable drug or mass produce a product, there should not be retroactive enforcement against asneeded compounding in the absence of demonstrated safety and efficacy problems.
341 Greenwood, supra note 47, at 1–2, 13–14.
Greenwood notes that the FDA has twice
explicitly declined to consider cost in application of the ODA. Id. Both instances involved the
statutory provisions for withdrawing market exclusivity: once in the context of defining clinical
superiority and, again, in assessing sufficient quantities to meet public health need. Id. at 1 n.2.
338
339
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that an appropriate equilibrium has not been reached in this
circumstance.342
Consequently, practicable limiting criteria must then be explored
to guard against price increases resulting from market exclusivity
conferred to repurposed products under the ODA regimen. A novelty
threshold or a standard-of-care test could be implemented before
conferring orphan designation or market exclusivity. However, one of
the important distinctions between regulatory exclusivities and
patents is the absence of an absolute novelty requirement for the
former. The intent of the ODA is not necessarily to bring new
treatments to those afflicted with rare disease but more generally to
“provide treatment for presently untreated patients.”343 A standard of
care test would place the FDA in the unenviable position of having to
render such a determination.
Also, there has been recent controversy regarding the extent to
which approval of a drug that has received orphan designation, and
the incentives attendant thereto, should be severable from receipt of
market exclusivity.344 As noted above, the FDA’s final rule draws a
definitive distinction between the requirements for orphan designation
and for ultimate market exclusivity, in the context of clinical
superiority. In fact, the FDA, in one instance, denied and, in another,
withdrew market exclusivity for a biologic and a drug, respectively.
The orphan drug received market approval, but the FDA did not confer
exclusivity for failure to demonstrate clinical superiority over a
previously approved drug, which had not been designated as an orphan
drug and had not received market exclusivity therefor.345 In response
to a citizen petition, the FDA withdrew the biologic’s market
exclusivity, concluding the Agency had erroneously informed the
sponsor that clinical superiority had been demonstrated.346 Therefore,
there is precedent—albeit in a different context—to sever market
approval for an orphan-designated product and market exclusivity.
The FDA should have the necessary flexibility so market exclusivity
need not automatically flow from orphan designation and subsequent
approval in other exceptional circumstances. Many have encouraged
Greenwood, supra note 47, at 2.
Orphan Drug Regulations, supra note 67, at 35,122 (emphasis in original) (citing
Genentech, Inc. v. Bowen, 676 F. Supp. 301, 312 (D.D.C. 1987)).
344 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(12) (2013) (“A designated drug will receive orphan-drug exclusive
approval only if the same drug has not already been approved for the same use or indication.”).
345 See Kurt R. Karst, Another Orphan Drug Battle; Depomed Sues FDA Over GRALISE
Orphan Drug Exclusivity, FDA L. BLOG (Sept. 26, 2012 10:27 P.M.), http://www.fdalawblog.net/
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/09/another-orphan-drug-battle-depomed-sues-fda-over-graliseorphan-drug-exclusivity-.html.
346 See Kurt R. Karst, FDA Rescinds Orphan Drug Exclusivity for Wilate; A First-of-its-Kind
Decision,
FDA
L.
BLOG
(Aug.
8,
2012,
8:40
P.M.),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/
fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/08/fda-rescinds-orphan-drug-exclusivity-for-wilate-a-first-of-itskind-decision.html.
342
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and praised the flexibility exercised by the FDA in reviewing clinical
trials associated with orphan products due to the unique challenges
and unmet need surrounding rare disease—inuring to the benefit of
industry and patients alike.347 This flexibility ought to extend to
administration of orphan incentives as well, likewise owing to the
unique circumstances surrounding the small patient populations. Yet,
such a paradigm would regrettably also add uncertainty to the market
and complicate and lengthen the regulatory process.
As a system of imposed caps is likely an untenable solution,
greater pricing transparency should be considered in the orphan space,
or over the pharmaceutical market generally.348 Profit margins should
be defined across entire product portfolios, including all approved
indications, not based on a single product or indication alone.
Transparency will also have the virtue of enabling an assessment of
whether the other ODA incentives that reduce development
expenditures on the front end actually lessen the price of the drug to
patients and payers. Similar to the amendments already proposed,
pricing transparency could also enable the orphan program to mandate
that a company identify an acceptable profit margin, with either a
reduction in the cost of the drug thereafter or, alternatively,
repayment of quantifiable government investments. Though less
widely applicable, prescriptions or sales could be tracked as a measure
of rarity, rather than a purely monetary-based threshold. Again, the
gross profit—freely established by the company—would be maintained,
with a price reduction per dose once the use of the drug exceeds the
surrogate measure consistent with 200,000 individuals, as
demonstrated by all prescriptions or sales. The price reduction per
dose would be proportional to the increase in demand. This proposal
would have particular relevance to those recurrent treatments—some
of which will accrue over a lifetime—for which prevalence is a poor
predictor of commercial opportunity. While creating a potential
disincentive to expand legitimate use of the therapy, such a scheme
that creates a reduction in profit margin with increased sales might
also encourage industry surveillance of off-label uses for which there is
little evidence of effectiveness and/or limit impermissible marketing of
unapproved indications, both in order to avoid exceeding the threshold.
347 See PREMIER RESEARCH, THE SCIENCE OF HOPE: THE NEED, THE CHALLENGES AND THREE
PROVEN STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESSFUL ORPHAN DRUG DEVELOPMENT 3, available at http://premierresearch.com/images/uploads/The_Science_of_Hope_the_need,_the_challanges_and_three_proven_st
rategies_for_successful_orphan_drug_development.pdf.
For example, the FDA has exercised
flexibility with regard to surrogate endpoints, where the natural histories of rare disease are often
unclear. See generally, Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Characteristics of Clinical Trials to Support
Approval of Orphan vs Nonorphan Drugs for Cancer, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2320, 2326 (2011).
348 See Steven Simoens, Pricing and Reimbursement of Orphan Drugs:
the Need for More
Transparency, 6 ORPAHNET J. RARE DISEASES 2011, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3132155/; see also Brian P. O’Sullivan et al., Pricing for Orphan Drugs: Will the
Market Bear What Society Cannot?, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1343 (2013).

[13:667 2014]The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

716

In either threshold scenario, the limitations could run concurrently
with the duration of any ongoing orphan incentives received. If growth
in sales or prescriptions were to near the limit of unprofitability,
manufacturing incentives could be entertained.
However, this
recommendation might perversely encourage higher initial costs, if a
company were to protect against future reduction in prorated revenue
by inflating the initial profit margin. Ultimately, the opportunity in
the orphan space must be equivalent to the wider pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries, in order to maintain appeal. As such, and as
ever, the orphan-drug incentives together with projected revenue must
approximate the profit potential in the wider market.
Potential ideas that ought to be explored, in lieu of wider
application of the ODA, are tax credits or subsidies for industrysponsored access programs to avoid direct and unquantifiable passthrough costs, targeted investment in manufacturing capacity, and
stratification of price depending on use.349 Other ideas that have been
proffered include waivers from antitrust laws to allow payors to
negotiate collectively to reduce drug cost350 and value-based insurance
reimbursement for drugs.351 Still others have proffered notions of
social and distributive justice.352 While certainly the collaboration
between patient advocacy groups and industry have blurred these
lines, dictates of shareholders and profit maximization are innately
inconsistent with applicability of such notions to corporations as
currently constructed. Of note, Washington and other states have
devised social purpose corporations (also known as benefit or B
corporations), which provide a legal basis to consider philanthropic
motives for corporate decision-making.353 Such corporate structures
may prove better suited for the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries.
Still, despite concerted effort from all stakeholders to streamline
drug development, the healthcare system may yet not be able to
withstand what the market has thus far tolerated.354 In that calculus,
market exclusivity should not be conferred to products already
available on the market, where already used for the specific indication
349 Kesselheim et al., supra note 216. Under such a paradigm—though potentially difficult to
track at present—products prescribed for approved indications could command a premium price,
with lower prices for off-label uses. Id.
350 Id.
351 Michael Drummond, The Move to Value-Based Pricing for Prescription Drugs, XONOMY
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.xconomy.com/national/2011/12/21/the-move-to-value-based-pricing-forprescription-drugs/; see also DELOITTE, VALUE-BASED PRICING FOR PHARMACEUTICALS:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT FROM VOLUME TO VALUE 1 (2012), available at http://deloitte.wsj.com/
cfo/files/2012/09/ValueBasedPricingPharma.pdf.
352 Rai, supra note 168, at 256.
353 See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25 (2010); Social Purpose Corporation, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/SocialPurposeCorporation.aspx.
354 O’Sullivan et al., supra note 348.
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for which approval is sought and, particularly, where publicly funded
research would be used to support the application.355
In such
circumstances, the manufacturer’s reinvigoration of a possibly lagging
health technology under the watchful eye of the FDA is an inadequate
contribution for such public investment and private reward. Rather,
such instances should be viewed through the prism of a manufacturing
deficiency and incentivized accordingly.
While incentives to
manufacture existing drugs for known but unprofitable indications
may be needed, the ODA—and market exclusivity, particularly—is not
the appropriate mechanism to achieve this result.
Alternative
methods to spur production of non-profitable but necessary drugs, such
as methotrexate, should be considered.356
If, without a new pricing structure in the future, market
exclusivity does create rampant monopolies and exorbitant costs
through repurposing, as more diseases are sub-classified by genotype,
it may become necessary to reduce the statutory threshold for orphandrug designation or, in contravention of the recent final rule, to limit
application of the ODA to only those diseases with a prevalence of
200,000—effectively eliminating qualification based on an orphan
subset of a disease with a prevalence greater than 200,000. While
disaggregation of more pervasive diseases based on pharmacogenomics
serves the economic purpose of the ODA,357 the dramatic increase in
products amenable to orphan designation—marketing exclusivity and
monopoly pricing therefor—may accelerate the cost curve and prove an
unsustainable model.
Pharamacogenomics, and personalized medicine more generally,
may create the new orphans. If the panoply of therapies is to become
increasingly diverse based on the particular needs of smaller and
smaller cohorts of individuals, an increasing number of products will
require manufacture.358 Rarity negating profitability will no longer be
See Orphan Drugs, BIO, supra note 83.
Linda A. Johnson, Methotrexate Shortage: Doctors Urge More Production Of Scarce Cancer
Drug, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/methotrexateshortage-scarce-cancer-drug_n_1276304.html. Interestingly, some have suggested that Congress
look to the ODA as the template in drafting legislation that will incentivize drug manufacturing for
unprofitable generics. See Letter from Brian M. Rosen, Senior Vice President of Public Policy,
Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, to Leslie Kux, Assistant Comm’r for Policy, U.S. Food and Drug,
Admin.,
(Mar.
14,
2013)
available
at
http://www.lls.org/content/nationalcontent/
pdf/ways/LLS_Comments_to_FDA_re_shortages_3_14_13.pdf. However, market exclusivity would
only delay the concern for a period of time, assuming no alternative treatment is found in the
interim.
357
Though, it could be argued that the intent of the ODA is best served by targeting drug
development for those truly rare diseases which have historically affected so few individuals as to be
unprofitable, as opposed to predominantly supporting cancer therapeutics—cancers being much
more pervasive generally.
358 Valerie Castle & Matthew Davis, New Prescriptions for Shortages of Vital Drugs, U. OF
MICH. HEALTH BLOGS (Mar. 12, 2012), http://uofmhealthblogs.org/childrens/voices-from-mott/newprescriptions-for-shortages-of-vital-drugs/827/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
355
356
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the determinant limitation but, rather, capacity will be challenged.359
Will the market be able to accommodate the diversity with sufficient
production capacity or will governments, patients, and advocacy
groups be left to find new methods to incentivize inclusion in a market
saturated with medications for diseases with a prevalence less than
200,000 individuals? The recent rise of biotechnology companies
certainly portends the beginning of this trend.
The current tenor of optimism surrounding the development of
orphan products stems from greater collaboration between the various
stakeholders, with a patient-centric focus.360 The FDA, patients,
patient advocacy groups, payors, academia, and life-sciences companies
have begun a concerted effort for earlier engagement and consistent
communication.361
Such a complement of resources will create
efficiencies, and more significant buy-in will go a long way to
ameliorate what have been very entrenched and counterproductive
attitudes. Still, it remains to be seen whether a more inclusive, and
yet more individualized, healthcare industry in the U.S. can
accommodate the diversity while transitioning to a system that
ensures affordable access to sustained innovation.

359 Patrick Rajan, Personalized Medicine: Targeting a Market of One, FROST & SULLIVAN (May
19, 2004), https://www.frost.com/sublib/display-market-insight.do?id=19196998 (“Manufacturing
capacity will have to be ramped up since biomanufacturing facilities are scarce and can take up to
five years to become fully operational.”); see also THE BIOBUSINESS OF MINNESOTA AND DELOITTE
CONSULTING LLP, DESTINATION 2025:
FOCUS ON THE FUTURE OF THE BIOLOGIC AND
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 23 (2009), http://www.biobusinessalliance.org/Files/531111_d2025
_whitepaper_biopharmaceuticals_biologics_smaller_secured.pdf
(“With
the
demand
for
biotechnology products rising, manufacturing capacity has become scarce . . . .”); Reducing
Prescription Drug Shortages, Exec. Order No. 13,588, 76 Fed Reg. 68,295, (Oct. 31, 2011), available
at
http://uscodebeta.house.gov/view.xhtml;jsessionid=559E25FA7CC7A047272812BA291CABD3
?req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title21-chapter9-subchapter5&saved=%7CZ3JhbnVsZWlkOlVTQy1
wcmVsaW0tdGl0bGUyMS1zZWN0aW9uMzU5%7C%7C%7C0%7Cfalse%7Cprelim&edition=prelim)
(“An important factor in many of the recent shortages appears to be an increase in demand that
exceeds current manufacturing capacity.”); see also Angelo De Palma, Making Medicine Personal,
BUFFALO
NIAGARA
ENTERPRISE,
(Aug.
2007),
http://buffaloniagara.org/About_BNE/
PressRoom/2007Archive/August/MakingMedicinePersonal.
360 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS, IMPROVING THE PREVENTION,
DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT OF RARE AND NEGLECTED DISEASES 5–6 (Mar. 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/UCM266374.pdf. But see Anusha
Kambhampaty, Big Pharma Not Yet Ready to Adopt Orphan Companies, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept.
23, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/502d775a-2489-11e3-8905-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ozfVkMiw
(citing current and former executive vice presidents of NPS and BioMarin, “[t]he patient focus of
orphan drug development is a major point of difficulty for big pharma . . . . Culturally, it will be
difficult for big pharma to get into the orphan space, as there is an aspect of social work . . . . Orphan
drug developers get to know each individual patient they are treating, which is much different than
the big pharma model . . . .”).
361 Brewer, supra note 41 (describing the importance of university, industry partnerships).

